This text is from:

http://www.dli.ernet.in/cgi-bin/metainfo.cgi?&title1=The%20Fall%20Of%20Amanullah&author1=&subject1=Asia&year=0%20&language1=english&pages=74&barcode=6010010075800&author2=&identifier1=Librarian%20Rashtrapati%20%20Bavan&publisher1=&contributor1=&vendor1=NONE&scanningcentre1=rashtrapati%20bhavan%20library&slocation1=NONE&sourcelib1=Rashtrapati%20Bhavan%20Library&scannerno1=&digitalrepublisher1=Rashtrapati%20Bhavan&digitalpublicationdate1=2003-12-20&numberedpages1=&unnumberedpages1=&rights1=OUT_OF_COPYRIGHT&copyrightowner1=&copyrightexpirydate1=&format1=Book%20&url=url

The Fall Of Amanullah., 6010010075800. . 0. english. Asia. 74 pgs.

Citation is from:

http://www.idcpublishers.com/ead/dsc.php?c01=bi.03.02&faid=362faid.xml

Title: The fall of Amanullah. Translated from the Persian of Shaikh Ali Mahboub by Maj Robert Noel Girling Scott Foreign & Political Department,
Dates: Mar 1930
Physical description: [2], 61p. map, 33cm.
File number: L/P&S/20/B289
Notes: Secret
Notes: Delhi: Government of India Press, 1930.

PRESIDENT'S SECRETARIAT
(LIBRARY)

Accn. No..... Class No.....

The book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below.

PREFACE.

In this translation from the Persian every endeavour has been made to render it as literal as possible without destroying the impression which the author has sought to convey.

The events and movements which have been described will, probably, have lost their interest in the course of a few years but the impression conveyed may remain. The sordid commerciality of the sycophants and officials, the general treachery of all classes, the unscrupulous scheming for power and wealth, portray an Afghanistan despicable and unstable despite the veneer of civilization imposed on it by Amanullah.

R. N. G. SCOTT.

APPENDIX.

" Anjuman Himayah Niswan " .	Women Friends Society.
" Qaryadars "	Headmen of villages—maliks—(from " Qaryah " a village).
" Sangar "	A defensive position built up with stones.
" Nizamnamah "	The constitutional law as promulgated and interpreted by the King.
" Fatwa "	A religious decree making an act legitimate according to the Quran or traditions.
" Muhtasibs "	Officers in charge of public morals.
" Charsi "	A " chars " smoker (from " chars " hemp).
" Bairaqs—Bairaqdars ". . .	Standards. Men who rally under such standards in time of national emergency.
" Fatihah "	Title of the first chapter of the Quran. Read out at shrines or while visiting the dead or mourners in their houses.
" Jehad "	A crusade or holy war. Can only be sanctioned by a Muslim King on the unequivocal advice of recognised ecclesiastics or directly and independently of the wishes of the temporal power whether it be Muslim or otherwise, by the latter.
" Rais-i-Tanzimiyah " . . .	Chief Civil Official with practically autocratic powers.
" Ilaqadars "	Men of outstanding influence in a district " Ilaqa ", district, tract of land, territory.
" Farman "	A signed order by the King. Royal Warrant.
" Taluqdars "	Petty nobles, squires, rich landlords.
" Jashan "	Celebration of some national or important event.
" Chandauli "	A type of veil used in Chandaul, a suburb of Kabul, residents of which are Qizilbashes (Non-Afghans).

CHAPTER I.

Introduction.

Between the two nations, Russia and Britain, in their rivalry for the domination of the East, lies Afghanistan, which forms an almost insuperable barrier preventing either from actual encroachment on the domains of the other. Afghanistan is the breakwater against which the waves of Russian ambition break but which Russia in her desire to reach her British rival in the one vulnerable spot throughout the Empire, has so far not succeeded in submerging.

Devoid of modern communications, lamentably poor in agricultural products, a land of free-booters, Afghanistan offers no aid to any military force operating at any distance from its base. India was safe from aggression from the North whilst the state of affairs in Afghanistan provided such a barrier. To obtain and retain her grip on the political and commercial affairs of Afghanistan the Government of India paid to the Amirs of Afghanistan an annual subsidy which amounted to Rs. 18 lakhs from 1905-1919 and, in return, Afghanistan conducted her foreign policy through the Government of India. The system worked adequately and Russia's influence in the political affairs of Afghanistan amounted to no more than a weapon in Afghan hands for bargain making in the matter of subsidies.

The Great War had scarcely terminated when Amanullah ascended the throne of Afghanistan and precipitated a war between his country and India, the result of which immediately altered the whole complexion of politics and has brought the possibility of a war between Russia and Britain a great deal nearer.

Amanullah, in the ordinary course of events, had no chance of coming to the Afghan throne as both his uncle. Nasrullah Khan, and his half brother, Inayatullah Khan, had prior claims The jealousy of a woman provided the impetus and a woman's brain engineered the scheme by which the Amir Habibullah was murdered and the rightful heirs rendered impotent and which enabled Amanullah, her son, to reign in Kabul. That woman was Ulya Hazrat, the daughter of Shaghassi Shir Dil Khan who had been a person of considerable power at the court of Amir Sher Ali. Of great character and remarkably intellectual she wielded considerable influence over her husband, the Amir Habibullah, until towards the end of his reign. Then, when Habibullah had withdrawn, to all intents and purposes, from the affairs of State and spent his days in shooting and hunting and in the company of the ladies of his harem, Ulya Hazrat allowed jealousy to sway her other feelings and enraged at Habibullah's preference for other women of the seraglio she quarrelled with her husband. The feelings of the two changed to hatred of each other and tired of the bickerings and violent scenes between himself and his wife, Habibullah undermined gradually his Queen's position, soon neglected her entirely and finally expelled her from the Palace.

Towards Amanullah, Habibullah also completely changed and thenceforth Amanullah was shown no paternal favour or interest Mother and son had completely fallen from royal favour.

Determined on revenge against Habibullah, Ulya Hazrat schemed to supplant the father by her son and to this end she now bent all her energies. She fostered the idea in Amanullah's mind that he one day should and might rule in Kabul. Amanullah eagerly responded to his mother's suggestion and he agreed to act on her advice and to obey implicitly her orders.

Amanullah's schooling then began in earnest, and in her endeavours to make him fit for public election to the throne she was aided by her relatives, men of outstanding ability in Afghanistan, the Loenab Khushdil

Khan, who was her own brother: Muhammad Sarwar Khan, who on two occasions had been Governor of Herat and who was known in Afghanistan as the Grand Old Man: Sardar Muhammed Yunus Khan and others. So Ulya Hazrat succeeded in collecting round her son some of the ablest brains of Afghanistan and into their capable hands Amanullah was placed and they left no stone unturned to achieve the purpose of Ulya Hazrat.

It was a difficult task that they had been set for Amanullah was not the heir to the throne. There was no popular feeling against either Nasrullah or Inayatullah Khan. Amanullah was no outstanding figure who had inflamed popular imagination. And so the tutors of Amanullah had to devise ways and means whereby Amanullah could stand in the limelight superior to those who were the rightful heirs, so that when the opportune moment arrived the peoples of Afghanistan would readily accept him as their King.

During the latter days of the reign of Habibullah the administration of Afghanistan had been entrusted by him to his brother, Nasrullah Khan, and to his sons, Inayatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan. Nasrullah Khan administered matters connected with revenue and made all appointments to Governorships and other official posts in Afghanistan. Inayatullah controlled and supervised the army and all Judicial matters. To Amanullah was handed over the control and administration of the "Khawanin" cavalry, then known as "reserve troops". Amir Habibullah himself kept comparatively aloof from the administration of his kingdom.

Both Nasrullah Khan and Inayatullah Khan, had, in consequence, considerable influence and, therefore, Amanullah schemed to undermine the influence of both his uncle and his brother and to win over to his side and to gain for himself the friendship of men of influence and power in Afghanistan so that, should the opportunity occur, he might be in a favourable position to contest with the rightful heirs the throne of Afghanistan Amanullah, therefore, ingratiated himself with all men of influence coming to Kabul from the outlying Provinces and made it his business to smooth away any difficulties for them. If the object of their visit was with Amanullah himself then he personally attended on them and before they left for their homes he would present to them substantial gifts. In a short space of time Amanullah had won over to his side spiritual leaders of the calibre of the Hazrat of Shor Bazaar, Shah Sahib of Kala Qazi and other important mullahs as well as tribal leaders, men like Mir Zaman of Kunar; Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Andar Ghilzai; Khans of the Tarak section of the Ghilzais, Beys of Turkistan, Mirs of Hazarajat and men of influence and importance amongst the Durranis and Ghilzais.

When any man of standing happened to be in trouble and in custody Amanullah immediately worked to obtain his release. If the case was one which was beyond his own executive powers and the matter lay with the person of either Habibullah or Nasrullah Khan, Amanullah would expend money secretly on behalf of the detenue and kept in close touch with him, cheering him up with his sympathy and kindness.

For two years this policy was maintained and in that period Amanullah's fame was spread throughout the country by those who had received favours at his hands whilst visiting Kabul. He was talked about and his magnanimity and sympathetic consideration were eulogised and extolled. In this way Amanullah captured popular opinion.

A coincidence, fortunate for Amanullah though intended in reality as a punishment, played an important part in Amanullah's subsequent successes. When Amir Habibullah and the Royal entourage moved to Jalalabad from Kabul to avoid the rigours of the winter in the latter place, Amanullah was left in Kabul, ostensibly to act as vice-regent, but in reality, to deny to him the comforts of a winter in Jalalabad. Habibullah and his adherents were so blinded by Fate and so deeply immersed in the pursuits of pleasure that they entirely failed to realize that Amanullah looked on his segregation in Kabul as a veritable gift from the Gods. Amanullah was not slow to seize the opportunity offered. During the

months in Kabul as head of affairs he used to set free important prisoners, clothed them and gave them the wherewithal to enable them to reach their homes. He paid especial attention to the army. He distributed money amongst the rank and file in order to win their good will. He visited important persons who happened to be ill and even attended the "fatihah" ceremony when they died. By such means Amanullah brought his personality into the lime-light and he made such an impression on the minds of the people that he was considered as a real friend to all.

As has been stated already, Amanullah was in control of the "Khawanin" cavalry—its administration and pay was in his own hands. Amanullah sanctioned the pay and allowances of sowars, who had been on the registers from the time of the Amir Abdur Rahman and had long since been dead, for the use and benefit of their families, particularly for those who were Durranis of the Kandahar and Herat Provinces. Reports of Amanullah's hospitality, his kindness and generosity spread all over Afghanistan and Amanullah became the idol of the country.

Successful in having won the regard of the masses, Amanullah then turned his attention to those who were high officials in the immediate entourage of his father. His first endeavour was with Muhammad Nadir Khan and his brothers. To three of these men he promised his three sisters: Others, such as Shuja-ud-Daulah, were not overlooked These were won over by promises of money and lucrative employment. By degrees the ground was prepared for the murder of Habibullah. The plot was maturing for three years but was eventually discovered by Mirza Muhammad Hussain Khan, Maustaufi-ul-Mamalik, a well-known philosopher and learned man. He wrote secretly to Habibullah that "It is not for us servants to cause friction between father and son but in view of trustworthy information in my possession, Amanullah Khan's line of policy can only signify two things, one being the assassination of yourself with a connivance of a clique of your officials who are his accomplices, and after your assassination the seizure of the throne for himself, for he has seduced the army and your subjects from their allegiance to you".

Amir Habibullah summoned the Maustaufi and at a secret meeting obtained full information concerning the plot and was convinced of the truth in the statements made. Habibullah decided to have Amanullah executed and Ulya Hazrat punished adequately. Amanullah's spies working in the Amir Habibullah's entourage immediately gave him warning. Mother and son hastened to Nasrullah Khan, threw themselves at his feet and implored him to intercede on their behalf. In his extreme simplicity of heart, Nasrullah Khan not only successfully interceded with his brother on their behalf but also made certain statements which completely refuted the allegations made by Maustaufi Muhammad Hussain.

For the time being the plot was scotched. Nevertheless the conspirators decided that it would be fatal to their cause, and therefore to themselves, if the final arrangements for the assassination of Habibullah, on which they were all solidly decided, should again miscarry.

The Amir Habibullah was shot and killed in his tent at night whilst in camp at Laghman during a shooting tour. Shuja-ud-Daulah, suspected of complicity in the murder, contrived to leave Jalalabad immediately after the event and joined Amanullah in Kabul.

Immediately after the assassination of Amir Habibullah, Nasrullah Khan proclaimed himself, in Jalalabad, as Amir of Afghanistan, and in order to retain the support of the army authorised an increase of Rs. 2 in the pay of the troops. The people in Jalalabad took the oath of allegiance to Nasrullah. Amanullah, as pre-arranged, proclaimed himself Amir in Kabul and declared an increase of Rs. 6 to the troops.

The affairs of Nasrullah Khan in Jalalabad, however, did not flourish. On the other hand written allegiances poured into Amanullah accepting him as Amir. Printed copies of Nasrullah's alleged abdication, previously prepared by Amanullah were distributed far and wide in all the Provinces; and all Afghanistan accepted Amanullah with the exception of Mazar-i-Sharif,

where some trouble resulted owing to the Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif, Muhammed Usman Khan, being in favour of Nasrullah. The struggle in Mazar-i-Sharif was, however, short lived. The local military forces, acting in the interest of Amanullah, seized Muhammed Usman Khan and despatched him under escort to Kabul.

After his acceptance by the people of Afghanistan as their Amir, Amanullah took the reins of Government into his own hands. He selected and appointed his own officials; promoted those who were in favour and dismissed those with whom he was displeased. Amanullah also took measures to investigate the murder of his father. He spread the report that the murder had been committed through the connivance of Nasrullah, in order to get his uncle into his clutches and also to discredit Nasrullah as he would, inevitably, be looked on with scorn by Afghanistan. Mahmud Khan, Yawar, the Shahghassi, was despatched to Jalalabad in order to convey to Kabul the persons of both Nasrullah and Inayatullah. They were brought to Kabul by motor car and were, on arrival, thrown into prison in the Arq.

The Jalalabad garrison, on learning the news of Amanullah's accession to the Amirate, mutinied and seized Nadir Khan, who was then the Sipah Salar (Commander-in-Chief), his brothers and servants, the court officials and also Mirza Muhammed Hussain, Maustaufi, robbed them and sent them to Kabul in charge of Colonel Ali Shah Khan who was a Qizilbash Saiyid.

A travesty of a trial for the murder of Habibullah took place in Kabul. Amanullah released the Nadir brothers and exonerated them of all blame! Nasrullah and Inayatullah were kept, however, in custody. Colonel Ali Shah Khan a young man of 24 years of age was held responsible for the commitment of the murder and was found guilty of the crime, inasmuch as he had been the officer on duty at the time when the crime was committed. He was also found guilty of the alternative charge of abetment of the murder on the grounds that, although he had detected the assassin, yet he had permitted him to escape. The sentence of death was passed on him and although absolutely innocent of the crime he was executed. Killed by the bayonets of the troops for he had been held guilty of murdering a King. So ended the trial of the murderers of Habibullah. The guilty had paid the penalty. The affair was ended.

Amanullah now turned his attention to the civil administration. He ordered the seizure of the persons and properties of those men who had enjoyed positions of trust at the court of the late Amir. Maustaufi Muhammed Hussain was hanged as Amanullah considered that he had shown animosity towards him even during his early years. Thus did affairs progress.

When investigation was made of the financial state of Afghanistan it was discovered that a large deficit existed. The public revenues could not meet the increased expenditure due to the increase made in the pay of the troops. Argument was raised that, through necessity, owing to the action taken by Nasrullah in raising the pay by Rs. 2, the pay of the army had been raised by Rs. 6 by Amanullah in order to obtain its support in gaining the throne. The throne had been gained, the necessity no longer existed. An attempt was therefore to be made to persuade the troops to surrender, voluntarily, the increase made in their pay and to obtain a petition from them that on the grounds of public exigency and the inability of the country to bear the increased military burden the pay of the troops should be lowered from Rs. 20 per month to the original Rs. 14. The decision arrived at was that should the troops be prepared of their own accord to a reduction in their pay their offer should be accepted; if, however, should they refuse it was decided gradually to discharge all men then serving and to replace them with men enlisted at the rate of Rs. 14 per month.

At this period relations between the Government of Afghanistan and India were rapidly becoming strained. News of the proposed retrenchment in the pay of the Afghan troops had leaked out and had produced an unfortunate effect on the army. The position in Kabul was daily becoming more

and more delicate. News of the seriousness of the situation reached Amanullah through his secret agents. Every morning placards and posters denouncing Amanullah as a liar and a schemer appeared in the bazaars and barracks. Agents of the imprisoned Nasrullah and Inayatullah also spread propaganda against Amanullah. In order to quieten opinion, which was fast hardening against him, Amanullah turned to the only expedient possible and declared a "Jehad" against the British Government with the ostensible object of breaking away from the tutelage of India and of obtaining the Independence of Afghanistan but, in reality, to cement the allegiance of the Afghan people to his cause and person. Having decided on declaring a "Jehad" Amanullah moved the troops in Kabul under Saleh Muhammed Khan, the Minister for War, towards Dakka. Nadir Khan and his brothers were moved into the Simat-i-Janubi and Sardar Abdul Quddus Khan, the Prime Minister, to Kandahar. Instructions and prepared schemes were issued to all the above. No actions or movements which would precipitate hostilities were to be made until definite further orders were received. Saleh Muhammed Khan, however, being indiscreet and without taking any thought for the future acted unwisely in the vicinity of Jalalabad and the subsequent hostilities broke out prematurely. The Prime Minister and Nadir Khan acted on their instructions and did not take any provocative action.

The third Afghan War lasted about 7 months and resulted in a treaty being signed in Kabul between the British and Afghan Governments. Prior to the commencement of action which led to the Anglo-Afghan War an "Extraordinary Mission" consisting of Muhammed Wali Khan, Ghulam Siddiq Khan, Faiz Muhammed Khan and Mirza Muhammed Khan had been despatched to Russia. Russia had just emerged from the throes of a terrible revolution and the Bolsheviks had not attained complete power and, in consequence, were apprehensive of any contingency arising which might impair their progress and, especially, any action by the British of aggression or the fomentation of revolution against them in Panjdeh, or on the frontiers of Turkamania and Bokhara. The only real counter to any potential aggression against the Bolshevik interest lay, in their opinion, in establishing a conflict between Afghanistan and India. The Bolshevik Government, too, was at this time diplomatically unrecognised by Europe, owing to the system of Government then in vogue in Russia. No diplomatic relations at that time existed between Russia and Afghanistan. Consequently when the Mission headed by Muhammed Wali arrived in Russia and asked for recognition of Afghanistan as an independent nation with reciprocal diplomatic privileges and the appointment of Ministers and Consuls to the respective capitals and in the two countries according to international customs, Lenin accepted the proposal with the greatest pleasure. Lenin saw in the proffered friendship of Afghanistan the furtherance of his schemes and also the required counter to any potential aggression by the British against Russian interest, for, in his opinion, conflict between Afghanistan and India would inevitably follow. So a treaty was signed between Russia and Afghanistan. In point of fact, however, the third Afghan War had already commenced without any utilization of the situation created by the flouting of British interests in favour of Russia as a "casus belli".

After cessation of hostilities between Afghanistan and India and the subsequent signing of peace, Amanullah appointed Nadir Khan as Minister for War, replacing Saleh Muhammed Khan, who had already been disgraced for his disobedience of the orders not to precipitate hostilities.

Two of the sisters of Amanullah, three of whom, as previously indicated, had been promised to the brothers of Nadir Khan, were married to Shah Wali and Shah Mahmud, a third was married to Ali Ahmed Jan through the influence of Ulya Hazrat who favoured her nephew, but Nur-us-Siraj betrothed to Muhammed Hasham Khan in accordance with Amanullah's promise, was withheld and not married.

The result of this act on the part of Amanullah and the subsequent marriage of Nur-us-Siraj to Muhammed Hassan Jan, as will be seen later, had far reaching results and led to the estrangement of Nadir Khan and his brothers from the cause of Amanullah.

Amanullah now bent his energies to the augmentation of his depleted treasury and to achieve this object ordered the collection of all arrears of revenue. He dealt ruthlessly with all criminals, and military courts passed severe punishments in accordance with Amanullah's orders in every part of Afghanistan. Education, too, was encouraged by Amanullah and schools were formed in all Provinces. Other reforms included the abolition of slavery and the introduction of telephony.

Amanullah, ambitous to adopt Western customs, established Ministries, promulgated the "Constitutional Law" and passed ordinances defining and limiting the powers of public servants.

In order to win over and to come to a settlement with the frontier tribes of the Eastern Province, who were still recalcitrant, Amanullah sent Nadir Khan to Jalalabad. Nadir Khan received the co-operation of the following men in the Eastern Province:—

Badshah Gul, son of the Haji of Turangzai; the Mullah of Chaknaur; Maulvi Fazal Rabbi; Malik Muhassil Khan; Mohmand; Mahmud, the Akhundzada of Tirah, Allah Nawaz Khan, an Indian Muhajir and Maulvi Muhammad Bashir Khan, President of the Mujahidins of Chamarkand. Whilst engaged in frontier affairs Muhammed Hasham, Nadir's brother, attended to all civil matters connected with the administration in Jalalabad.

In order to enlist the sympathy of the influential men to the cause of Amanullah, Nadir Khan fixed liberal allowances for every Malik and Mullah of importance, which amounted to the sum of ten lakhs of rupees. To spread propaganda, Nadir started the paper "Ittihad-i-Mashriqi" and also undertook on behalf of the Afghan Government to defray all expenses incurred by the publication of the "Al-Mujahid" of Chamarkand thus ensuring its wide distribution.

In the midst of these activities Jamal Pasha arrived in Kabul. This Turk, together with Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha, had formulated a plan of setting up an independent Muslim State in the East which was to be comprised of Russian Turkistan, Afghan Turkistan and the Hazarajat, the inhabitants of which were all of Turkish origin. In Kabul, Jamal Pasha supported by Mahmud Beg Tarzi, who was a Turcophil, convinced Amanullah that Enver desired to see Russian Turkistan annexed by Afghanistan and that Syed Alam Khan, the Amir of Bokhara, had entrusted him with a message to Amanullah which was to the effect that it was the Amir of Bokhara's ambition to see Bokhara joined to Afghanistan with the co-operation and assistance of Afghanistan. Jamal Pasha convinced Amanullah of the desirability of secretly aiding Enver Pasha, and in order to make more effective the military help which was to be forthcoming, Jamal undertook the reorganization of the Afghan army. He made an initial start with the creation of a body of men who were styled "Qita Namuna" or "Model Formation". Into this body of men was enlisted Habibullah, the Bacha-i-Saqao, the present Amir of Afghanistan.

Amanullah was, swayed by the plausible arguments of Jamal Pasha and despatched a small force comprised of 200 infantry, two elephants and a few guns under the command of Brigadier Fazal Ahmed Khan, Muhammedzai, to Bokhara. To assist Enver Pasha, Nadir Khan was ordered to Badakshan, Muhammed Ibrahim Khan to Mazr-i-Sharif and Shuja-ud-Daula to Herat. Instructions given to these men were to the effect that all precautions were to be taken to guard against Russian aggression on the Afghan frontier and that active propaganda for Enver should be instituted in Russian Turkistan. These three officers were ostensibly sent to their respective stations appointed "Rais-i-Tanzimiyah". Afghan officers were also sent in disguise to Enver. The enterprise failed. Shuja-ud-Daula,

who was given up to luxury and self indulgence, failed miserably in Herat. Muhammed Ibrahim in Mazar-i-Sharif succeeded in establishing communication between himself and Enver. Arrangements for the despatch of men had also been made but, unfortunately, the details of the arrangements fell into the hands of the Russians and not being in cypher, the contemplated measures were rendered ineffective.

Nadir Khan sent men in disguise consisting of Mangals, Zadrans and Ahmedzais who were under him. He also sent soldiers.

The despatches of the Foreign Office, Kabul, carried by a courier, were waylaid by robbers working at the instigation of the Russians and, in consequence, all the documents fell into Russian hands.

The result was that within 24 hours Bokhara was laid waste and thousands of "puds" of gold were taken from Bokhara to Moscow.

Enver himself fell in battle, his corpse being discovered by the Russians lying with other bodies. The Afghan soldiers in Bokhara were killed and the elephants and guns fell into Russian hands.

The intervention of Afghanistan into the affairs of Bokhara had been hailed in Kabul as a bold stroke of diplomacy but it was soon realized that the Afghans had been made tools of by the Turks. The relations between Russia and Afghanistan were somewhat strained as a result of the latter's provocative action but no reprisal was made by Russia nor did she indicate her displeasure or cognisance of Afghanistan's attitude *vis-a-vis* themselves as Russia was in need both economically and politically of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER II.

Amanullah turns his attention towards Afghanistan's Progress and the removal of Internal Defects.

After the publication of the "Constitutional Law", Amanullah, in the space of three to four years, gradually introduced legislation consisting of 70 to 80 articles which covered all branches of administration and also defined and limited the powers of officials. A Council of State was also instituted members of which were experienced officers drawn from the several Provinces—the important Governors; representatives of the people; Deputy Governors and Governors of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd order and also Ilaqadars.

A school for girls was opened and established in Kabul. Although there was some resentment on the part of the public against this institution as the establishment of such a school was contrary to custom, nevertheless the daughters of two classes of the people entered it, namely, those belonging to the official class, who were apprehensive that they would be deprived of their appointments and positions if they objected, and those who were of lowly origin—barbers, shoemakers, etc.

Schools were also opened for the teaching of German and French. English was relegated to the background in the educational syllabus of Afghanistan.

Training in special subjects was not provided for in Afghanistan but batch after batch of boys was sent to Europe to be trained in professional subjects.

Education was organized in Afghanistan on such an extensive scale that whereas in the first year of Amanullah's reign expenditure on education had been Rs. 60,000 (Kabuli) it now amounted to 8 million Kabulis.

Amanullah, with a view to the improvement of the health of the country and also to ameliorate the condition of the people, opened hospitals and dispensaries.

Several further reforms were introduced including that of the establishment of a "Bureau of Identification". Through this Bureau every citizen of Afghanistan was provided with an "Identity Card".

European Powers were approached to exchange ministers and Afghanistan became represented in foreign countries.

New legislations, fresh reforms and proposals for the progress of the country were put forward by Amanullah. His particular attention was, however, bent on matters in connection with his legal enactments. He personally scrutinized the orders passed by his officials and meted out punishment to the law breaker and rewarded those who had done well towards the State. Visits were paid by Amanullah to the Eastern Province (twice), Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Katagan in order to enquire himself into the methods adopted for the enforcement of law. On each occasion Amanullah was accompanied by officials from the various ministries. In this way a regard for law became firmly rooted in the minds of the officials and the Afghan people were made cognisant of the necessity to abide by the laws made.

The financial state of the administration was not overlooked and budgets were prepared showing revenue and expenditure. Annual expenditure on ordinary heads were fixed and grants were made to the several Provinces. Expenditure on heads not specially provided for necessitated the sanction of Amanullah himself.

In the vigour of youth and with the goal of progress before her eyes Afghanistan, like a child, began to run forward with blind rapidity. Advancement and civilization became the passion of Amanullah. In order to

win the approval of the King courtiers and journalists vied with each other in showering flattery on Amanullah and praising all his actions. The praise of these sycophants mounted like strong wine to his head and Amanullah became firmly convinced that never before had such a genius been fashioned in the womb of the world.

Absorbed in the creation and building of the new city, "Dar-ul-Aman", in municipal matters, in the illumination of roads, the establishment of factories and female education, Amanullah was blind to the aspirations of Afghanistan, to the needs of the army, ignorant on matters connected with frontier affairs and domestic and foreign policy.

The false picture painted by the "Aman-i-Afghan" by its fulsome flattery and its insincere laudings of the genius of Amanullah might be replaced with advantage by the picture conjured up by the following couplet of Saadi of Shiraz :—

"Milord Tom Noddy feasts his eyes,
On gaudy furniture and supper room,
The while his palace basement gapes and cries,
"See'st thou not here the cracks of doom."

Flattery and applause of Amanullah became the fixed habit of his ministers and entourage in order to gain their own ends. To please Amanullah palaces were erected by them in Dar-ul-Aman and Paghman. Money was subscribed towards companies and factories. But the end that Amanullah's ministers had in view was the lining of their own pockets and this they succeeded in doing to such an extent that, even now, thousands of pounds are deposited in their names in foreign banks. It was but natural, however, that private greed would lead to national disunity. Antagonism and suspicion soon raised their heads. As a result the intelligentsia of Afghanistan banded themselves together in separate parties with different objects in view. One such was that of Muhammad Wali.

On return from Europe of the Mission headed by Muhammad Wali, Amanullah showered favours on Muhammad Wali; he was raised to very great power, was decorated personally by Amanullah with the highest honour in Afghanistan and received Rs. 10 lakhs in cash and property and was appointed Foreign Minister in place of Mahmud Beg Tarzi. In Kabul a number of individuals who had been educated and who had travelled in foreign countries secretly joined Muhammad Wali's party and in secret discussed the possibilities of the formation of an Afghan Republic. These individuals included the following :—

Ghulam Siddiq Khan; Abdul Hadi Khan; Habibullah Khan (Deputy War Minister); Abdur Rahman Khan, Laudin; Ali Muhammad Khan; Mirza Muhammad Khan; Mir Saiyid Qasim Khan; some military officers and also unimportant men like Mir Ghulam Muhammad, etc. Shuja-ud-Daula Khan and Muhammad Yakub Khan (Wazir-i-Darbar) were also in the party. This party came to the conclusion that without the co-operation of the military the object they had in view would come to nothing as the example of Mustafa Kamal and Riza Khan, Pehlavi, were before them. They resolved, therefore, to get rid of Nadir Khan, who was the War Minister, and insert Muhammad Wali in control of the army. This movement was to be the stepping stone to their further plans. It was unanimously agreed that Nadir Khan should be replaced as decided and it was accomplished as follows :—

Amanullah was confidentially informed that, in consequence of the withholding of the bestowal of Nur-us-Siraj in marriage to Hasham Khan, both he and Nadir Khan had felt themselves insulted and had determined either to obtain possession of Nur-us-Siraj, die in the attempt or kill Amanullah, her brother. On the other hand Nadir Khan was informed that Amanullah was about to bestow the hand of his sister to Abdul Aziz Khan

who was the Minister for the Interior. The conspirators succeeded in subverting the loyalty of Nadir Khan from Amanullah and in alienating Amanullah's feelings towards Nadir Khan. As soon as Nadir Khan realized that Amanullah's feelings had changed towards him, the conspirators informed him that Amanullah had become afraid of his growing influence and had determined to bring about his ruin.

In furtherance of the scheme a man was tutored to fire on Nadir and this he did one night. Nadir considered that Amanullah was personally involved in the plot. He immediately shut himself up in his house and on the pretext of illness resigned his appointment as Minister for War. Nadir did not leave his house until rebellion broke out in the Simt-i-Janubi. In this rising Nadir had no hand whatsoever. It was solely through the mismanagement of the Hakim-i-Ala (Governor) of the Province, Amir-ud-Din Khan. Nadir, however, had considerable influence in the Southern Province and had even put down a rebellion there during the reign of Amir Habibullah and after he had quelled it the people of that Province had been treated with magnanimity by both the army and by the officials. This treatment was, in the main, due to the policy advocated by Nadir, and his influence in the province was gained through that policy. Nadir's enemies, however, saw in the rising an opportunity to bring about Nadir's downfall. They informed Amanullah that Nadir Khan was at the bottom of the rebellion and that he was feigning illness to avoid being involved. They impressed on Amanullah the fact that Nadir Khan was unfitted to hold office. Amanullah appointed Muhammad Wali as Deputy War Minister, who after a short period in that appointment, put forward a proposal for the complete removal of Nadir Khan from the control of the army in order that he (Muhammed Wali) should be in a position to quell the rising in the Southern Province. Muhammad Wali pointed out that he held only the appointment of Deputy War Minister whereas Nadir was still Minister for War and it was, therefore, to Nadir that the people looked. Amanullah agreed and Nadir Khan was advised to go on a trip to Europe and to quit Afghanistan. Nadir Khan left Afghanistan and Muhammad Wali was appointed War Minister in his stead.

Despite the expenditure of large sums of money and the sacrifice of many lives, it took eight months to settle the affairs of the Southern Province and even then the settlement arrived at was far from satisfactory.

Muhammad Wali's right hand man in the War Ministry was Habibullah. In this man Muhammed Wali reposed entire confidence. Gradually all the protogees of Nadir were dismissed and were replaced by men selected by these two men. A reduction of the strength of the army was budgetted for and the resultant savings were utilized for the purchase of material for the army. Purchases were made through the agency of unscrupulous men and, in consequence, both Muhammad Wali and Habibullah benefitted themselves.

In order to render the Government impotent, if and when revolution occurred it was essential to have a discontented and a weakened army Muhammad Wali, therefore, worked with this end in view. Garrisons in the Provinces were formed of men who were drawn by lot from their own Province. Ration money was stopped in Kabul and cooked rations were issued instead. Grain allowance seldom ever reached the men in full. Officers utilized this allowance for themselves and issued only sufficient to the men to keep body and soul together. The soldier thus was in no position to maintain his family as he himself was starving and, in consequence, his family were forced to beg.

The strength of the Republican Party increased as time went on and the number of its adherents was very large indeed.

Some influential men were against the Republican Party and these included the following:—

Abdul Karim Khan, Naib-ul-Hukuma;

Muhammad Sarwar Khan, Naib-ul-Hukuma;

Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Naib-ul-Hukuma;

Sher Ahmed Khan, Rais-i-Shaura;

Abdul Ahad Khan, Wardak;

Abdul Aziz Khan, Minister for War when Amanullah was in Kandahar and Mahmud Khan, Yawar.

Mir Hasham Khan, who was shrewd, kept on friendly terms with both parties. He was the Minister for Finance.

Ali Ahmed Khan, the Wali, had his own personal ambitions and did not side with either party.

Amanullah deliberately shut his eyes to the existence of this plot despite all the movements which were in train. When disclosures were made to him he would insist that it was to the advantage of any would be plotter to be on his side as, being dependent on him, they would desire a strong King not a weakened one. When, however, the fact was forced on Amanullah, he was afraid to take active repressive measures, as the conspirators were many and all held high appointments. He sought, instead, opportunities for bringing disgrace on them. But the conspirators had so surrounded him that when he saw their apparent devotion to his person he once more inclined to the belief that the reports he had received were mere fabrications. Amanullah's suspicions were dulled to such an extent that when Amanullah proceeded on his tour to Europe, Muhammad Wali relinquished the office of Minister for War and stepped into the position of being Deputy to Amanullah and as Amanullah's Regent attended to public affairs as if he were King. But alas!

CHAPTER III.

AMANULLAH'S JOURNEY TO EUROPE AND THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING THAT PERIOD.

As has already been stated, Amanullah's associates while he was still a prince, were experienced elders whose advice he followed and as a result of which he became the first man in the realm and ascended the Afghan throne despite the difficulties and obstacles which lay in his path. When Amanullah, however, fulfilled his ambition he discarded his old associates. He chose instead for companions Mahmud Beg Tarzi and his sons and Mahmud Sami and Muhammad Hassan Khan, his nephew, to whom he married Nur-us-Siraj, his sister. Amanullah was extremely attached to Muhammad Hassan Khan whose education Amanullah had personally undertaken from the time when the former was 14 years old. Another companion of Amanullah was Muhammad Yaqub, the Wazir-i-Darbar, with whom he had been intimate while a prince. These intimate friends of Amanullah constantly talked of Europe. In particular, members of the Tarzi family, both male and female, urged Amanullah to visit Europe. The incessant reference to the wonders of Europe made the necessary impression on Amanullah and he made up his mind to go. At this time, whether a fact or whether it was merely a suggestion on the part of Mahmud Beg Tarzi, the King indicated that he had received an invitation to visit Italy from the Italian Government. The public was unaware of the invitation and the only persons who were informed were those of Amanullah's own entourage.

A visit to Europe entailed absence from Afghanistan for a considerable period and, as the matter was no ordinary one, Amanullah convened a conference of his ministers at which he made the following statement:—

"We are to a certain extent satisfied with the progress of internal affairs and with complete freedom and independence Afghanistan is advancing favourably. Obedience to the laws of the country is observed from one end of it to the other. Everything is turning smoothly on its axis. I, therefore, consider it essential that I should now visit Europe and bring back with me material for the progress of my beloved country in the shape of knowledge of the habits and customs of the people of the world. I shall gain experience and will introduce factories for the manufacture of various articles. A glance at the history of Peter the Great of Russia will show that after introducing internal reforms he journeyed to civilized countries and studied their progressive methods with which he then flooded his own native lands and as a result of which the present Soviet Government is considered a virile administration. It was all due to the efforts of Peter the Great that Russia freed herself of foreign needs. It is, therefore, necessary for me to tread the same path."

The conference was divided in its opinion. Those who had personal interests in Amanullah's proposed tour and those who were flatterers supported the King. Those who held opposite views cited instances of the Persian King's travels, those of Nasir-ud-Din and Ahmed Shah and the result of such. These discussions continued for several days until finally, when it was patent that the King was bent upon going, consent was obtained.

The appointment of a Regent in Afghanistan during Amanullah's absence in Europe was now necessary. The man whose selection appeared obvious was Abdul Aziz, the Minister for the Interior. Despite his con-

nection with Amanullah and Abdul Aziz's own obvious aspirations to be appointed, Amanullah made the choice of Muhammad Wali. His reasons were as follows:—

He had become distrustful of Muhammad Wali and on this account his removal from the War Office was considered desirable and also Muhammad Wali had, without doubt, qualifications which fitted him for the post of Regent. So Muhammad Wali was created Regent of Afghanistan and also was placed in charge of the portfolio of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Abdul Aziz was appointed Deputy War Minister and was created "His Majesty's Second Regent." It is possible, too, that he was given secret instructions to exercise full control over the War Department and to keep a watchful eye on the movements of Muhammad Wali and to report any action which appeared to him to be at all suspicious. If any action harmful to Amanullah was contemplated by Muhammad Wali arrangements had been pre-arranged by which Abdul Aziz would replace Muhammad Wali as Regent.

Amanullah also informed Abdul Aziz that he should consider himself responsible to the King for the state of Afghan affairs during Amanullah's absence.

Mahmud Khan, Yawar, was appointed Deputy to the Wali of Kabul. The Intelligence Department was placed under him. He was issued with a secret "farman" in which extraordinary powers were conveyed empowering Mahmud Khan to put to death secretly any person found guilty of treason against Amanullah or of spreading revolutionary agitation.

Mahmud Khan was also ordered to furnish regular reports on the more important happenings in Afghanistan.

In the Foreign Ministry, Muhammad Adib, brother-in-law to Mahmud Beg, Tarzi, and maternal uncle to Queen Souriya, was instructed to make secret reports to His Majesty concerning Muhammad Wali.

The following three persons, who were not trusted by Amanullah and whose presence in Kabul was considered to constitute a danger, were entered on the list of those who were to accompany the King to Europe:—

(1) Ali Ahmed Jan, the Wali of Kabul, against whom Amanullah had always the greatest mistrust.

(2) Habibullah Khan, Assistant War Minister, who was considered to be Muhammad Wali's right hand man and the chief advocate of the republican party.

(3) Sher Ahmed Khan, Rais-i-Shaura, who subsequent to his being Afghan Minister to Italy, had become very antagonistic to Muhammad Wali and Abdul Hadi, the Minister in London, Sher Ahmed had quarrelled with Abdul Hadi and the latter had been supported by Muhammad Wali. This had embittered the feelings of Sher Ahmed against the latter. Amanullah realized that in his absence Sher Ahmed would not be loyal to Muhammad Wali and considered that only harm to the country would result from the inevitable bickerings.

All arrangements for the tour of the King having been completed, Amanullah paid farewell visits to the Eastern, Southern and Northern Provinces. His object was to impress the people of those Provinces that the *raison d'etre* of his visit to Europe was not to satisfy any selfish desire to travel for mere pleasure but to obtain an insight into the means whereby he would be able to further the progress of his country and on his return to utilize any knowledge gained by him to free his country from their dependence on foreign powers. In Kabul likewise Amanullah voiced the above sentiments in a speech delivered by him in the Idgah Mosque.

On the 29th November 1927 Amanullah with his entourage left Kabul for Chaman *via* Kandahar. Reference to the incidents of Amanullah's European tour is outside the scope of the present book.

After the departure of Amanullah the relationship between Muhammad Wali and Abdul Aziz were amicably maintained although, in reality, the two persons were not on good terms with each other. Abdul Aziz himself plunged into sensual pleasures and took little interest in the affairs of State.

Bribery and corruption became the order of the day and all officials, from those of the Court itself to important public personages, took bribes as a matter of course. An example showing the corruptness prevailing in Kabul is furnished by the case of one Ashur Bai, an inhabitant of Andkhui, Maimana, a wealthy man who had been sentenced to death for murder. Orders for his execution were issued on three occasions from the court of Muhammad Wali and three times the execution was stayed as a result of the monetary efforts made by Ashur Bai's relatives.

Muhammad Wali walked warily and gave no opportunity for any fault finding. The Financial Minister, Mir Muhammad Hasham Khan, established himself at the court of Muhammad Wali but this was due entirely to the fact that he was a very useful channel for augmenting Muhammad Wali's income. In the internal affairs of Afghanistan Muhammad Wali displayed commendable aptitude for administration. His concern was to create an impression favourable to himself as an administrator and he hoped that, after a lengthy administration in Amanullah's absence, if any opportunity occurred, he himself might be considered as fitted to assume sovereign power.

An interesting incident which occurred during his Regency bringing some credit to Muhammad Wali was that concerning the insertion, true or otherwise, of one of the descendants of either Amir Yaqub Khan or Amir Ayub Khan into the Southern Province. The rumour which was prevalent at the time was to the effect that one such had appeared and that he had done so with the connivance of the British Government whose object was to foment trouble in that portion of Afghanistan in order to force Amanullah to cancel his proposed visit to Moscow and to return post haste to Afghanistan. According to some people the actual arrival of one or two such individuals was a fact and it was further stated that they had been arrested in the Mangal country and sent to Muhammad Wali in Kabul. Others state that Muhammad Wali, acting without the knowledge of the official in charge (Hakim-i-Ala) of the Southern Province, had secretly arranged with the Commandant of Police (Kotwal) to send in a false report of the arrival of such individuals.

Muhammad Wali communicated the report to Amanullah by cipher telegram assuring him at the same time that there was no cause for anxiety as the affair had been settled.

The estate of Muhammad Hussain, Maustaufi, who has already been referred to, had been given to Muhammad Wali. These were situated at Killa Murad Beg in Koh-i-Daman. Muhammad Wali used often to visit his estates during the week ends. His associates in Killa Murad Beg were all natives of Koh-i-Daman and during some of these visits they interceded on behalf of an outlaw who was a refugee in Koh-i-Daman, living in the mountains and caves, one Habibullah, the Bacha-i-Saqao. Habibullah according to them had repented of his past misdeeds and Muhammad Wali's "Talukdars" were prepared to stand surety for him. Muhammad Wali eventually agreed to see Bacha-i-Saqao if he were produced before him on his next visit during darkness. This was accordingly done. Muhammad Wali informed Habibullah that, even were he to pardon him, his life would never be spared by Amanullah. Muhammad Wali promised to aid Habibullah provided that the latter agreed to abide by what he was ordered to do by the former. Habibullah agreed and thereafter used to visit Muhammad Wali secretly in Killa Murad Beg and received both arms and money from him.

The plan formulated by Muhammad Wali was to preserve tranquillity in the country during his regency and after Amanullah's return to Afghanistan to work through Bacha-i-Saqao and to instigate him into commencing operations according to the instructions he had received.

If his plans succeeded the future was bright for Muhammad Wali. If they failed the fortune that he had amassed would be sufficient for his necessities and he would, under the pretext that his leg needed medical treatment, go either to Germany or Russia accompanied by his accomplices such as Ghulam Siddiq and Habibullah to await developments, in the same way as Nadir in the South of France was awaiting the opportunity to seize the throne of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER IV.

Amanullah's return from Europe.

The Institution of the "Loe Jirga".

MODERNISATION.

After Amanullah entered Persian territory information was received that he would enter Afghanistan by way of Meshed and Herat. Muhammad Wali, who was acting as Regent in the Capital in co-operation with the Cabinet arranged a ceremonial reception. It was decided that one of the ministers as representative of the Afghan officials and a member of the Shaura as a representative of the whole nation were to be sent to the Herat frontier to receive the King. It was also decided that Governors and chief officials were to celebrate the occasion by holding a three days "jashan" and towns *en route* were to be illuminated for three nights. A day's holiday was to be observed in all Government offices. The road along which His Majesty was to travel was to be decorated with arches of welcome alongside which the officials and others were to take their stand. In the Kabul area the arrangement was that the residents of Kabul and the officials were to proceed to Deh Mazang and Mahtab Killa in order to receive the sovereign. Aeroplanes carrying bouquets and leaflets containing messages of welcome were to fly as far as the Wardak boundary and there drop them on the King.

Mir Muhammad Hasham Khan, the Financial Minister was selected to represent the official classes and Abdul Hamid Khan, son of Sardar Abdullah Khan, Tokhi, from the National Shaura to represent the nation. They were accompanied to the Herat frontier by a number of servants and a squadron of the Shahi Risala.

The Governor of Herat and important local officials left with the party from Kabul and arrived on the frontier to do honour to Amanullah.

On the arrival of Amanullah in Herat he remained indoors for two days and on the third day he was entertained to tea by the Heratis and at that function he met the leading men of Herat. He addressed the gathering but restricted his remarks to saying that he was quite aware of what the officials had been doing during his absence and that some of the petitions of the people had reached him. Owing to the fact, however, that he had very important and urgent work waiting for him in Kabul he was unable to remain longer in Herat. He made a promise that he would return the same year to Herat when he would take the opportunity to carry out an investigation of the complaints made by the people and to scrutinize the conduct of his officials.

On the following day he left for Farah. Amanullah was received at the Farah boundary by Abdul Hamid Khan, the Governor, who accompanied the King into Farah.

Amanullah's attitude was not a gracious one. He would not converse with his officials and spoke only on two occasions with the Governor once when he asked him as to the climate of Farah and once when he was departing from Farah when in response to the Governor's expression that he hoped the onward journey would be pleasant merely said "thanks" shaking his head.

Not one of the many Khans, elders and inhabitants of Farah had an opportunity of meeting Amanullah but what they did see were the ladies of the royal party unveiled and in European dress. They were filled with amazement and dismay.

The Governor of Kandahar, Muhammad Sarwar Khan proceeded as far as Girishk to meet the King and accompanied Amanullah to Kandahar where he stayed for about two to three days. Amanullah looked on the Kandaharis with special favour. He considered them as his own clansmen and gave them credit for being broader minded than other Afghans. Amanullah spoke on several occasions to the Kandahar public and left for Kabul.

The Governor of Kandahar returned from Mukur while Amanullah drove on towards Kabul. At Ghazni no halt was made and the night was spent in Dasht-i-Top, Wardak, which place is in the vicinity of Maidan.

The following day, amidst great pomp and splendour Amanullah made his entry into Kabul. He arrived in the morning and held no public reception for two or three days. He then gave a reception in the evening to members of the several ministries.

A short time afterwards "farmans" were issued summoning to Kabul representatives from the Provinces. Men to be selected to attend the "Loe Jirga" or the "Grand Council of the People" were to be those who carried the esteem of their tribes and who were men of sense and influence. All expenses in connection with the "Loe Jirga" and the attendance of the representatives were to be met by government and during their stay in Paghman the members of the "Loe Jirga" were to remain as guests of the King.

Before assembling the "Loe Jirga" Amanullah had issued the following orders :—

(1) The oriental custom of greeting amongst Musalmans namely "Salam Alaikum" was to be discontinued and the lifting of one's hat as in European countries was to be adopted as the mode of salutation.

(2) No headgear was to be worn either in private houses or in government offices. In the streets headgear was to be worn but not the customary sheepskin hat but either European hats or peaked caps.

(3) The Persian interrogation as to the identity of a speaker utilizing the telephone was to be discontinued and the unfamiliar "Hallo" was to be used instead.

Amanullah also spoke to an assembly of his officials and truculently informed them that he was aware of the fact that drinking was a common practice amongst them and that they had in his absence taken bribes freely and that he would mete out harsh punishment to such offenders. He indicated that he would order doctors to rip open the stomachs of those he suspected of drinking in order that examination of their livers could be made to ascertain whether they took alcohol or not. To ascertain whether his officials had been taking bribes he would cause examination to be made of the expenses incurred by his officials and would balance these against their income and private means.

As the majority of Amanullah's officials were addicted to both heavy drinking and bribe taking they were alarmed at what the King had said, Amanullah's sole object in creating this atmosphere was to enable him to force his will in regard to the abolition of the veil without any opposition from the official class.

Gradually the discarding of the use of the veil was advised and encouraged and Amanullah observed that the idea was gaining in favour without having actually to pass orders against the wearing of it. The first officials who were, in fact, ordered to discontinue the practice of veiling were Mir Muhammad Hasham Khan, the Financial Minister, and Mahmud Khan, Yawar.

By degrees it became the custom for officials to take their wives unveiled to public places to Paghman, Cinemas, gardens, etc. To spread the custom the Kabul ladies were asked to come to the Dilkusha Palace to listen to an address on the subject by the King. A few of the womenfolk went and in the course of his speech were told by Amanullah that women had lived a life of subjection to the unnecessary tyranny of their husbands and were virtually prisoners in their own homes. He told them that he had proof that, owing to the custom of veiling a large percentage died of tuberculosis. He had had the advantage of having travelled and he had come to the conclusion that in no Muhammadan country other than Afghanistan, not even Turkey or Persia, were women "buried alive". Veiling had retarded their progress in education and had deprived them of the opportunity to take up professions in contrast to their Western sisters, in fact forcing them to be completely dependent on their husbands. Amanullah desired to see them disregard the wishes of their husbands in regard to veiling and attending public places of amusement. He advocated the shooting of interfering husbands and said he would, himself, supply the weapons and that no enquiries would be instituted against them. If they had to have a veil he advocated the Syrian style or the Kandahari style in preference to the "chandauli" veil which should immediately be discarded.

Two or three meetings similar to those already described took place in the Dilkusha Palace. All women are naturally susceptible to influence and these women, ill bred and good for nothing greedily absorbed the sentiments expressed by their sovereign and putting the precepts that they had heard uttered by him into practice showed great disrespect to their husbands. An unfortunate result was produced on the citizens of Kabul. Several men murdered their wives at night and fled. Such incidents although they reached the ears of Amanullah failed to influence him and he still persisted in his campaign for the emancipation of women. Orders were again issued through the President of the Kabul Municipality that widows and other unprotected women were to be employed in hospitals and laboratories recently founded by Amanullah. The Kabul Municipality and the Police endeavoured to obtain a list of such women but failed to do so. Attention from this enterprise was diverted, however, as other affairs of state became more important.

The day fixed for the "Jashan" was fast approaching. Orders had been issued that those who were not in possession of European dress would be precluded from attending Paghman to join in the celebration and festivities. Representatives selected from the several Provinces now began to arrive. Arrangements had already been made to provide these men with black coats and European hats. Members' badges were also arranged for as well as lodging and messes. Rooms were allotted on a scale of about 8—10 men per room and servants were provided whose duties included that of reporting secretly to Amanullah of the movements and opinions of the representatives.

A society called the "Anjuman Himayah Niswan" consisting of a few ladies as members and presided over by Kubra Jan, the King's sister, was now formed. The object of this society was the selection of young girls for education in Turkey. A number of girls 17—20 in number including two daughters of the Minister for Finance were selected to proceed to Turkey immediately after the "Jashan". All arrangements for their journey were made.

Amanullah in his opening speech at the "Jashan" referred to the emancipation of women and was vigorously applauded by the large number of ladies present. The "Jashan" was now in full swing and the representatives were allowed entry into the various amusement booths and places of interest free of charge. At night dancing girls brought from Germany entertained their audiences in a state of nudity. One dancing girl from India, Idan Bai, also gave dancing entertainments. The result was public consternation as such things are contrary to Afghan custom and contrary to Islam which forbids dancing by women in the presence of males.

Discussion in private amongst the public concluded that such dancing was contrary to "Shara". The representatives were particularly affected by such scenes and by the abolition of the veil. A joint written representation was made by them decrying the introduction of unlawful pleasures and was confidentially despatched to the King. Amanullah arranged a Garden Party to which only representatives were invited and spoke to them at length on the subject. No dissentient voice was raised by any of the representatives either because they had been convinced by Amanullah or feared to do so.

The "Jashan" ended and the "Loe Jirga" commenced its sittings in the Cinema House in Paghman. The first item to be discussed was the question of the change in the National Flag. It was decided to have a tricolour flag with hills and a sheaf of wheat incorporated. The representatives declared also for the words "Allah and Muhammad" to be incorporated and these words were agreed to.

The Criminal Code was next dealt with. Its object was the prevention of bribe taking by judges and the scale of punishments being fixed by them according to their personal sentiments.

The question of Mullahs trained in Deoband then came up for discussion. Amanullah was emphatic in his contention that all such Mullahs were influenced by foreign intrigue and in support of his contention produced proofs. He desired that all such Mullahs be expelled from Afghanistan or be forced to remain in one place from which they should not be permitted to leave without prior sanction.

It was decided in "Loe Jirga" that the fulsome and extravagant formal commencements to a letter were to be discontinued. It was likewise decided to abolish all decorations excepting military ones.

A lengthy discussion then ensued on the subject of bribery and corruption amongst officials. Amanullah indicated that his intention was to balance the income and the expenditure incurred by officials and any credit balances should be taken over by the State. To enable accounting to be carried out he suggested registers being kept by officials showing income and expenditure.

Amongst other items which were discussed and decided were the questions of abolition of polygamy and selection of the heir apparent.

The abolition of the veil, the question of the day, was at last referred to. Some Mullahs amongst the representatives spoke against this reform and quoted verses from the Koran and cited traditions in support of their views. Amanullah, in reply said that although he himself was not a Mullah still he knew that veiling in accordance with Islamic law was confined to covering the body from the throat down to the knees. The Mullahs emphatically refuted Amanullah's dictum whereupon Amanullah, recollecting the advice given to him by Mustafa Kamal, lost his self control and thundered out "All national calamities can be laid at your doors, you mullahs, who are nothing more than procurers of women. I shall enforce what I like and I will enforce this unveiling even at the point of the bayonet but not by flattery. Know that I am a revolutionary monarch". Then turning to the audience he screamed out "Oh representatives of my beloved nation! My advice to you, which advice you should explain to the whole nation is that you should realize that these mullahs are, through their teachings, responsible for the dissemination of enemy intrigues in this country. The backwardness of our people is due to the myths with which they feed the masses and by which they deceive them. I will deal with these mullahs in my own time. But you representatives should place the nation in a position to understand and not to be deceived by this handful of men, ill wishers of the nation". A hush fell on the assembly. The mullahs trembled with apprehension. Further discontent was engendered amongst the representatives. Then Ghulam Mohiyuddin Khan, member for Kabul, son of Sher Muhammad Khan, merchant, who had been educated in Russia, stood up and said "The ideas of Your Majesty are good. But why does

Your Majesty connive at the dishonesty of the ministers?''. This was spoken in the hearing of the ministers who were present in the assembly. Amanullah replied ''How have I connived?''. Ghulam Mohiyuddin answered ''It is ten years now that Your Majesty introduced rules and regulations for administrative procedure. Thousands of persons have been put to death or have received life sentences but not one single minister has been tried though Your Majesty must be aware of their dishonesty and has seen their palaces and their motor cars. Their bank deposits in foreign countries have been ascertained during the tour in Europe. It is patent, therefore, that no punishment is to be meted out to men of importance. Laws are merely made with the object of enabling ministers to enrich themselves at the expense of the public and of punishing those who are opposed to their views''. Amanullah informed Ghulam Mohiyuddin that what he had said had no bearing on the matter under discussion and was irrelevant. In the opinion of the ministers Amanullah had himself instigated Ghulam Mohiyuddin to speak as he had for had he not countenanced this speech Ghulam Mohiyuddin would never have dared to have voiced such an opinion.

Amanullah announced that the ''Jirga'' would terminate on the next day. Representatives who were residents of Kabul would be nominated and the remainder had permission to disperse to their homes.

CHAPTER V.

Causes that led up to the Revolution.

The revolution in Afghanistan has focussed the attention of politicians throughout the world. In Afghanistan itself the causes which led up to the revolution have been attributed by high officials and courtiers to the machinations of the British Government. Although the fact was emphatically known that the British Government had no hand whatsoever in the revolution, the Afghan people were tutored to believe that Mullahs in the pay of the British had engineered the rising in order that the Afghan nation's progress should be retarded and to stamp as heretical all actions and measures which were advantageous to the advancement of the nation.

The real motive lying behind the welter of blood and fratricidal strife was the weakening of Afghanistan and the dismemberment of this Islamic land. Amanullah's attitude contrary to the religious sentiments of Afghanistan added fuel to the fire. The causes of the revolution, however, as they appear to the writer are as follows :—

(*a*) The "Habl-ul-Matin" a newspaper published in Calcutta quoted the French Press in one of its issues referring to Queen Souriya and stated that the French were greatly surprised at the dress and manners of the Queen and other ladies of the Afghan Royal party as they "appeared to be European by nature and by descent". The object of the Editor of the "Habl-ul-Matin" was to bring discredit on Afghanistan because a member of this paper's editorial staff had been discourteously treated by Ghulam Siddiq whilst on a visit to Kabul and had returned greatly incensed at his reception. The effect produced in Afghanistan by this article was unfavourable to Amanullah.

(*b*) During the European tour numbers of photographs of Queen Souriya appeared in the European Press and large numbers found their way into Afghanistan depicting the unveiled Queen in European dress. Pro-Amanullahites destroyed as many copies as they could obtain but anti-Amanullah personages were able to circulate photographs of Queen Souriya throughout Afghanistan amongst influential Khans and mullahs. The effect produced was exceedingly bad. The Kabul Police endeavoured to collect all such photographs but they failed and the mischief had already been done.

(*c*) Whilst in Russia films were taken of Souriya showing her in the company of men, unveiled, and these films had been despatched to Afghanistan. When the films arrived from Moscow in Mazar-i-Sharif the Russian Consular Agent there wished to show them publicly but the Governor would not at first give his sanction. After three days of secret discussion the Governor agreed and official invitations were issued to all civil and military officers to view the films. A most undesirable impression was created on the audience some of whom protested to the Governor and characterised the films as being "revolutionary". The Governor replied that as the films were intended to be shown in Kabul itself they in Mazar-i-Sharif should have no qualms about the matter. The films were subsequently despatched to the Russian Legation in Kabul. They were shown for two nights in Kabul but as the effect produced was deleterious the Ministry for Education ordered the showing of the film be discontinued.

(*d*) When Amanullah arrived at the frontier station of Batum from Turkey *en route* to Persia, he received a telegraphic message from Riza Shah to the effect that while welcoming him to Persia it was hoped that the sentiments of Persia would be respected and that as Persia was a Muslim country that Queen Souriya would resume the wearing of her veil and thereby not offend the feelings of the "Mujtahids". Amanullah was considerably annoyed at this request but Queen Souriya wore a veil whilst in Persia. The stay in Persia was purposely curtailed and Amanullah hurriedly left for Afghanistan.

After his arrival in Kabul Amanullah made derogatory remarks concerning Persia in his speeches and on one occasion said that although half the houses in Tehran were brothels the "Mujtahids" had not raised their voices in protest against them but had singled out Queen Souriya for not wearing a veil. Amanullah considered the incident to have been a personal slight by Riza Shah. There was, subsequently, a decided animus against Persians and some who were employed in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education were dismissed and expelled from Afghanistan. Saiyid Muhammad, Taqizadah, an influential Persian merchant, was deported together with his brother and they suffered in consequence considerable loss.

At an open Darbar and in the presence of the Persian Minister, Amanullah stated that the one country which was in an even more backward condition than Afghanistan was Persia. The Qizilbash of Kabul, who held special personal appointments, lost prestige and the old style of veil used by Qizilbash women was henceforth described as "Chanddauli". Two things resulted. One was that the "Habl-ul-Matin" on account of the dismissal of Persians from official post commenced an intensive campaign on the question of veiling. The other result was that the Qizilbash turned hostile to Amanullah and inaugurated a campaign against him criticising his behaviour on his return from Europe.

(*e*) The "Loe Jirga" discussions antagonised the public and also the officials and ministers on account of the threatened action of Amanullah regarding the close scrutiny of the accounts of ministers, etc.

Fearing to lose their valuable properties and the wealth they had accumulated it was decided to divert Amanullah's attention from themselves to the suppression of a rising which it was agreed should be engineered.

The Shinwari rising was due directly to this reason and was engineered by Amanullah's officials for the reasons cited above.

(*f*) The system of village administration by Maliks and "Qaryadars" was abolished by Amanullah in about 1925 and in its stead villagers were made to have direct dealings with revenue officers and paid in their dues twice yearly direct and not through intermediaries. Although the new system was beneficial both to the peasant and the State in that the peasant avoided any extortion on the part of the Maliks and the State received its revenue at fixed times, this system did not benefit the Maliks who lost thereby their only means of livelihood and, in addition, had to pay up all arrears due from them. Their prestige and local standing also suffered, being deprived of the privilege of having formal relations with officials. As a whole the Maliks became antagonistic towards the Central Government and were biding their time to declare themselves openly against Amanullah. The rising provided the opportunity for which they were waiting and being in close touch with the people they immediately incited the masses to throw in their lot with the rebels and they themselves took a leading part in the upheaval.

(*g*) A cause for discontent was the practice of Amanullah of substituting for men of ripe experience holding official appointments, boys of low origin lacking, sometimes, even in education. Deprived of their appointments and thrown out of office these men, too, fostered discontent.

(*h*) Conscription and the methods employed to avoid service gave rise to almost general discontent. The method of obtaining the necessary quota of recruits was by drawing lots. Payments of a sum of Rs. 1,000 Afghani as purchase money exempted the recruit from service. If payment, owing to pecuniary circumstances, was not possible, exemption could be obtained by producing signed certificates from the residents of the locality or through religious intervention. Otherwise the man whose name had been drawn was bound to serve. As will be realized the purchase of exemption gave rise to corrupt practices and was a fruitful field for bribery. Persons of position whose names had been drawn bribed the officials who falsified identification registers to show such persons as sole supporters of families and without property. The poor and the friendless person on the other hand

if he desired to purchase exemption was forced to dispose of his all in all in order to raise the necessary Rs. 1,000 and in many instances families were reduced to complete penury on this account.

(*i*) Desirous of obtaining religious legality to his proposed reforms of unveiling, etc., Amanullah secretly asked Mullah Abdur Rahman, a high cleric, to sanction them. This he refused to do despite attractive offers of money and advancement. He was finally informed that if he persisted in with-holding assent he would be put to death. Abdur Rahman asked for five days in which to consider the question. This was granted. He consulted the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar who realized that were Abdur Rahman to become the object of hatred by Amanullah his fate would be a similar one and so they decided on flight together to the Southern Province with the ultimate intention of joining Hazrat Sher Agha in India. Their flight was discovered and they were both captured in the Jaji country. Mullah Abdur Rahman was shot and the Hazrat of Shor Bazaar was imprisoned in the Arq in Kabul. The facts of the case soon became public property and the anti-Amanullah party spread propaganda freely amongst mullahs that Amanullah had determined to carry out the advice given to him by Mustafa Kamal which was to kill or expel all mullahs in order that the road to progress should be freed from obstacles and that Amanullah had initiated his campaign by exterminating Abdur Rahman. The propaganda had the desired effect. Thoroughly nervous, the mullahs commenced to stigmatise Amanullah as a "Kafir". They preached against unveiling and the masses were told that soon all their wives would have to be unveiled and all their daughters would be sent to Turkey. The nation now turned hostile to Amanullah.

(*j*) Officials holding important appointments, enriched as they were but still greedy for more, would not pay attention to grievances laid before them unless they received gratification beforehand. These officials, too, had become so swollen with self conceit that the showing of any sympathy to the mere peasant never even entered their minds. They did not refuse bribes, however, but they never did anything even after having accepted a bribe. Men representing petitions seldom had a chance of dealing direct with the official. The unsympathetic and despotic attitude of his officials brought discredit on to the Amanullah regime.

(*k*) The Governments of Russia and Turkey paid great attention to Afghanistan: the two Governments, however, differed in their respective policies. The policy of the Turks aimed at furthering the influence of Turkey in Afghanistan with a view to establishing ultimately in Afghanistan and in parts of Persia, like Azarbaijan, and in Russian Turkistan, a government which would be under Turkish suzerainty. Professing to be real friends of the Afghans on Islamic grounds, Turkey provided military officers to train the Afghan army; accepted a large number of girls to be educated in Turkey and made attempts to further the extensive use of the Turkish language in Afghanistan.

The Turks persuaded the Russians to believe that their policy in Afghanistan, was aimed at strengthening Afghanistan, which being opposed to the desires of Britain, was inreality, therefore, advantageous to the Russians. Amanullah in his collosal inexperience allowed himself to be made a tool of by the two Governments. He favoured the Turkish policy which denoted a strong and independent nation, and Russia, too, signified her approval and supported the policy which aimed a blow at Russia's rivals.

Following the advice of Kamal Pasha, Amanullah despatched girls to Turkey to be educated. The plans of the two Governments began to take shape but the fire of revolution consumed Amanullah, and the well laid plans were destroyed. The calamity of the present revolution and its cost in men and money can be directly attributed to the suicidal policy of Amanullah in allowing himself to become a tool of the Russians and Turks.

CHAPTER VI.

The Shinwari rising: Bacha Saqao's attack on Kabul: Ammanullah's Flight to Kandahar.

The rising power of the Republican Party gave Amanullah pause to consider some means by which their power could at least be curtailed if not broken altogether. After the "Loe Jirga" had terminated its session, Amanullah formulated a scheme to achieve this end. He decided to appoint a Premier and to sanction the formation of a Cabinet to work under the guidance of and the supervision of the Premier which would deal with the internal affairs of State and so remove from him the responsibility of a large amount of work thereby enabling him to grapple personally with the more important business of State and also to enable him to give greater personal attention to foreign policy. The axe which was to be laid at the roots of the Republican Party was the Premier. His choice was to be from amongst those opposed to the formation of a Republic and the selection of the Cabinet, being in the hands of such a man, would likewise be made from men holding similar views. Amanullah saw in this conception of his a means by which the "Republicans" would be "killed" and hoped that they would be forced to leave the country and as a result, he himself would be safe. In furtherance of this scheme Amanullah wrote a "farman" to Sher Ahmed Khan, the Rais-i-Shaura. It was couched in the following terms:—

"Dear Sher Agha,

I intend that a Prime Minister should be appointed and you appear to me to be the most suitable person for the appointment. If you agree to the proposal will you form a Cabinet of ministers and submit their names to me for approval."

On receiving the letter Sher Ahmed Khan considering himself unfitted to hold such an important position became apprehensive and imagined that the letter had been written in order to test him as it was popularly believed that Muhammad Wali was certain to be chosen for the Premiership. Sher Ahmed Khan was both perplexed and nervous on account of this unexpected action of Amanullah. In a draft reply which he prepared Sher Ahmed Khan expressed his gratification at the honour bestowed on him and his appreciation of the Royal favour shown to him but begged His Majesty to accept his refusal which he tendered feeling that he was unworthy and because of his incapacity to shoulder the heavy responsibilities of the Premiership. This draft was however seen by some of Sher Ahmed Khan's friends including Abdul Aziz Khan (War Minister); Abdul Karim Khan, (Naib-ul-Hukumah); Faiz Muhammad Khan (Minister for Education); Sultan Ahmed Khan (Minister in Tehran) and others. They tore up the letter and advised Sher Ahmed Khan to accept the appointment and submit the names of those he desired to have in his Cabinet. Acting on this advice the following names were submitted:—

1. Abdul Aziz Khan—Minister for War.
2. Muhammad Haider Khan—son of Sher Ahmed Khan—Minister for Commerce.
3. Ghulam Siddiq Khan—Foreign Minister.
4. Abdul Karim Khan—Minister for the Interior.
5. Mirza Muhammad Ayub—Finance Minister.
6. Abdul Ahad Khan, Wardak—Minister for Justice.
7. Faiz Muhammad Khan—Minister for Education.

The list was submitted to Amanullah who only took exception to Muhammad Haider Khan on the grounds that as he was addicted to taking bribes he was not fitted to be the Minister for Commerce.

Amanullah was also uncertain whether Ghulam Siddiq would accept the Foreign Ministry in Sher Ahmed's Cabinet. When Ghulam Siddiq was approached on this point Sher Ahmed Khan was informed by him that not only he but about seventy other high officials, military and civil, all of whom, despite the fact that they were pro-Amanullah, had decided not to co-operate with the Cabinet under formation and were even prepared to resign their appointments. Amongst those who had decided to take this step were:— Habibullah Khan, Assistant War Minister; Fazal Ahmed Khan, Firqa Mishar: and the entire personnel of the Foreign Ministry. This move on Ghulam Siddiq's part was promoted by Muhammad Wali. At his wits ends Sher Ahmed reported the state of affairs to Amanullah. Realizing the strength of the opposition to Sher Ahmed, especially the military bloc, Amanullah dropped all idea of having Sher Ahmed Khan as Premier and started negotiating with Muhammad Wali informing the latter he was prepared to accept him either as Regent or as Prime Minister whichever position was acceptable. Muhammad Wali begged to be excused on the plea that he was suffering from overwork and also from intense pain in his leg on which account he was intending to proceed to Europe for medical treatment. He intimated, however, that on his return to Afghanistan he would be proud of the honour to serve his country. Amanullah approved of Muhammad Wali's suggestion and in a veledictory "farman" given to him Amanullah indicated his appreciation of the services rendered by Muhammad Wali and in addition presented him with a pecuniary gift. Muhammad Wali, however, postponed his departure from Kabul. Finally, at a public "darbar" Amanullah announced that his intention had been to appoint a Premier but realizing that the country was still unprepared for such a reform he had given up his intention and he would continue to conduct the affairs of State on the existing lines. He then referred to the persons he had selected to form the Cabinet. These were:—Abdul Aziz Khan, Minister for War; Ghulam Siddiq, Foreign Minister; Abdul Ahad Khan, officiating Minister for the Interior; Ali Muhammad Khan (then Minister in Italy), Minister for Commerce; Abdul Hadi Khan, Rais-i-Shaura; Sher Ahmed Khan, supervising officer of all the Ministries. The Ministers for Finance, Education and Justice were to remain unchanged.

This did not, however, meet with the approval of Ghulam Siddiq and his supporters. Dissatisfied they decided to incite one of the tribes into rebellion. Ghulam Siddiq, through his father Ghulam Haider Khan who had served for many years during the reign of Abdur Rahman in the Eastern Province, had great influence amongst the tribes and as it happened at this juncture two Shinwari leaders, Muhammad Afzal and Muhammad Alam were in Kabul. Ghulam Siddiq approached them with attractive promises and despatched them to their own country to foment trouble. A message was also sent to Sher Ahmed Khan, Muhammadzai, a relative of Ghulam Siddiq living in Besud, Jalalabad, where he owned property, to support the schemes of Muhammad Alam and Muhammad Afzal. On the arrival in their own country these two Shinwari leaders summoned their tribesmen and informed them that unless they desired to purchase exemption by the payment of Rs. 500 per girl it had been decided to despatch their daughters to Turkey for education. At the same time the Hakim-i-Ala Muhammad Sarwar Khan was dropped a hint that the arrangement of purchasing exemption was likely to bring him pecuniary advantage and as he was under orders for dismissal he would be wise to seize the opportunity and get as much money into his pockets as possible. This was the first spark to the rebellion in the Eastern Province.

At the commencement of the rebellion Amanullah attempted to bring about peace through tribal "jirgas" and also by persuasion. Failing to achieve any result from these peaceful methods, aeroplanes were despatched to bomb the rebels but these measures merely resulted in aggravating the situation. The Rais-i-Shaura, Sher Ahmed Khan, was then sent as Commandant at Jalalabad with orders to suppress the rising by military force

and through the assistance of other tribes. Meanwhile Ghulam Siddiq asked for permission to visit the Shinwari country. His request was agreed to and he flew in an aeroplane to Jalalabad from where he proceeded to the house of Muhammad Afzal on horseback. Muhammad Alam was also obtained. Ghulam Siddiq remained with the Shinwaris for a period of about fifteen days after which he returned to Kabul having accomplished nothing to bring about peace for the purpose of his visit had been to add fuel to the fire which was now burning brightly.

Saiyid Qasim Khan, Sar Munshi, and Haji Muhammad Akbar Khan, Frontier Officer, had by this time raised a Mohmand lashkar against the Shinwaris. Ghulam Siddiq had already formulated a plan which took into account the rapacity of the Mohmands and Khugianis and showed them the possibility of obtaining large quantities of arms and booty from the regular troops. The situation rapidly passed out of the control of Sher Ahmed Khan and he was recalled to Kabul. Ghulam Siddiq had returned to the Capital bringing with him a draft of the conditions for peace as formulated by the Mullahs of the Eastern Province.

As the conditions contained the following essential namely the expulsion of the whole Tarzi family from Kabul, both male and female, which, therefore, included the expulsion of Queen Souriya, the remaining conditions, impossible of fulfilment, can be surmised.

Ali Ahmed Jan was then sent to the Eastern Province and Mahmud Khan, Yawar, with a military force was despatched to Jagdalak. Kabul was denuded of troops to meet the threat from the South, and the garrison consisted of only the "Shahi Risala" and some Kandaharis. Seizing the opportunity which now offered itself Bacha Saqao, acting on the instructions of his master Muhammad Wali, arrived with 600 men, occupied the arsenal at Gululah Pushtah, seized all the rifles in the Military Training School, turned the Bagh-i-Buland into a "sangar" and for twelve days and nights threw Kabul into a state of complete panic. The "Shahi Risala" and the officials and citizens of Kabul joined hands to ward off the danger and aeroplanes dropped bombs on the rebels with the result that Bacha Saqao was repulsed and he withdrew to Killa Murad Beg in Koh-i-Daman. There he commenced immediately to collect further lashkars with which to launch a second attack against Kabul. No assistance was received by Kabul from any source. Amanullah realizing that he was isolated and that the Afghan nation had turned against him, acted on puerile advice and sent his mother the Ulya Hazrat—his family and the royal jewels to Kandahar in charge of Ghulam Siddiq. From this action it became apparent that Amanullah had become thoroughly frightened. Inayatullah Khan was put on the Afghan throne by Amanullah and, fearing for his life, Amanullah fled to Kandahar. When this news reached Bach Saqao he immediately surrounded the "Arq". For three days Inayatullah was besieged. Bacha Saqao publicly received Kabul's oath of allegiance. Eventually, through the intercession of Muhammad Siddiq Khan, the Hazrat of Shor Bazar, Inayatullah agreed to Bacha Saqao's terms that he should leave Kabul by air taking with him three lakhs of rupees.

Ali Ahmed Jan had, in the meantime, been made Amir in Jalalabad.

CHAPTER VII.

AMANULLAH'S DEPARTURE FROM KABUL TO KANDAHAR AND EVENTS IN KANDAHAR.

The decision to place Inayatullah on the Afghan throne was taken by Amanullah, who himself advocated and encouraged high officials in Kabul to take the oath of allegiance to his brother. Amanullah abdicated and his elder brother ascended the throne. In acting thus Amanullah had possibly three things in mind. He hoped that with Inayatullah King the rebellion would die out. The rebellion being dead Amanullah hoped that Inayatullah would hand back to him the reins of Government voluntarily or should that fail Amanullah hoped to win over the goodwill of the nation again to himself by judicious propaganda. Even if everything else failed Amanullah felt secure of a peaceful life in Afghanistan with himself as chief adviser to his brother.

Subsequent to the swearing of fealty to Inayatullah, Amanullah extracted a "farman" from his brother to the following effect. "As your family is in Kandahar it is considered necessary that you should go there in order to be with your people and also to facilitate public allegiance being offered to me by the Kandahar Province where it is well known you are held in high esteem and regard."

On the 12th January at eight in the morning Amanullah left Kabul for Kandahar. He left secretly. Abdul Ahad Khan, Wardak, Minister for the Interior, had been sent ahead in a motor car to ascertain whether the road was safe or not, as doubt existed, reports having been received that Bacha Saqao's men were occupying the tract between Arghandeh and Kotal-i-Takht on the Maidan road. Abdul Ahad was given orders to await the arrival of the royal party at Sheikhabad, which is half way between Kabul and Ghazni, if the road was clear, but to turn back and give timely warning to Amanullah should rebels be seen in the vicinity of Killa Qazi and Arghandeh. Amanullah, in this eventuality, had decided to turn back to Kabul and considered that it would be thought that he had merely gone out for an airing and had returned. As luck would have it there had been a heavy snowfall on the Kabul-Ghazni road and the cold had become intense. The rebels had temporarily left the neighbourhood and the road was clear. The rate of progress through this heavy snow was, however, very slow and Sheikhabad was reached after eight hours travelling. Amanullah's party consisted of Abdul Ahad Khan; Ghulam Siddiq (who a week previous had flown back to Kabul from Kandahar); Abdur Rahman Khan, Toli Mishar from Logar; Qamar-ud-din, Toli Mishar from Charasia and twelve men belonging to the Kandahar Shahi Risala.

Telephonic orders were issued from Sheikhabad to Janbaz Khan, the Hakim of Ghazni, to be present on the side of the road with food when the royal car arrived sometime in the evening. Orders were also to be telephoned on by Janbaz Khan for the immediate repairing of the Mukur road should it be necessary. Janbaz was also warned to keep absolutely secret the news of Amanullah's arrival. Ghazni was reached at about eight in the evening. The food brought by Janbaz was taken into the cars. Janbaz was ordered to make arrangements to obtain allegiance from the people of Ghazni to Inayatullah just as Abdul Ahad Khan had made similar arrangements among his own tribe, the Wardaks. Amanullah explained his own departure for Kandahar to be on similar grounds and Janbaz was ordered to intimate the expected arrival in Kandahar to Amanullah's brother-in-law, Muhammad Hassan Khan and to Abdul Karim, the Governor.

Having issued these instructions Amanullah left for Mukur and after two hours arrived at the village of Laram Ali Khel. Unfortunately there had been recent heavy rain in Ali Khel and the fair weather bridge at that

place had been destroyed by flood water. The cars stuck. It was still raining. Mukur was still 8 miles away so Qamar-ud-din was sent on ahead to obtain ponies and to return with them. He was away some considerable time and Amanullah fretting at the delay started off on foot through rain and mud taking with him as guide a local villager. Amanullah was accompanied by Abdul Ahad and Ghulam Siddiq. About half-way to Mukur they met the artillery horses which were being brought for their use and mounting them the party arrived in Mukur at about 12 o'clock at night. Amanullah's first action was to try and speak to Inayatullah on the telephone but he was unable to get telephonic connection beyond Ghazni and Sheikhabad. There was no reply from the Kabul Arq. He then rang up Kandahar. He spoke with Queen Souriya, Ulya Hazrat and Hassan Jan and assured them of his safety. He then spoke with the Governor of Kandahar and informed him that affairs in Kabul had taken a satisfactory turn and that the previous twenty fours information pointed to an early settlement of the disorders in the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Details, he said, would be given on his arrival in Kandahar. Abdul Karim, the Governor, replied "God willing all will be well. Having heard Your Majesty's voice I have taken on a new lease of life. My respects to all those who are accompanying Your Majesty." Amanullah informed him that only Abdul Ahad and Ghulam Siddiq were with him and that they were having a meal. He intimated the fact that they were stranded owing to the breaching of the road at the bridge 8 miles from Mukur which made it impossible to get the cars across and asked that cars should be sent to bring him into Kandahar, at the same time enjoining secrecy as to his arrival. Hassan Jan promised himself, to bring Ulya Hazrat's Rolls Royce.

At 2 A.M. Hassan Jan left Kandahar in the Rolls Royce with eight other cars, which were provided by the Governor, and arrived in Mukur at 7 in the morning. Amanullah was then having breakfast. Some Maliks belonging to Mukur were present and they were encouraged to take the oath of allegiance to Inayatullah which apparently they were prepared to do. At 9 A.M. Amanullah left Mukur and reached Kalat-i-Ghilzai at midday. Although a meal had been arranged at the Governor of Kandahar's suggestion by Faizullah Khan, the Hakim of Kalat, Amanullah only stopped to fill up with petrol and left immediately afterwards for Kandahar at which place he arrived at 4 P.M. He proceeded at once to the Seraglio where he remained for about half an hour. Officials of Kandahar, who had in the meantime collected, were then interviewed and dismissed. Amanullah then again entered the Seraglio.

Amanullah's unexpected and unforeseen arrival in Kandahar caused uneasiness in the city for about two to three days and some apprehension was felt that the town would be looted but no untoward incident occurred.

The day following his arrival Amanullah paid a visit to the Khirqa Sharif Mosque and as a large crowd had collected he spoke a few words in which he said that notice had been given by the President of the Kandahar Municipality that a public meeting had been convened in the Bagh-i-Salam and that he proposed at that meeting to furnish details and full accounts of the situation.

On the third day all officials, notables and thousands of citizens assembled at the "Salam Khanah" at 1 P.M. at which seating arrangements for the officials, etc., had been made, the others standing wherever they could find space. On the entry of Amanullah all officials jumped to their feet in order to pay homage to him. They were politely ordered to resume their seats. Amanullah sat down on a chair and asked the Governor to translate into Pushtu what he was about to say to him in Persian. The gist of Amanullah's speech to the assembly is as follows:—

"I pray that all is well with you and I am glad to see you all in such good health" (excitement and utterances of praise and Amanullah signed to the assembly to be silent). At this moment those who were standing in the

garden and being anxious to come nearer in order to hear better created a disturbance. Amanullah ordered Firqa Mishar Nek Muhammad Khan, who was standing in front of him, to go and quieten the people as he desired to speak. Complete quiet was restored and the audience strained every nerve to catch the words uttered by Amanullah. Resuming his speech Amanullah said "Perhaps my visit to Kandahar is causing some anxiety. I, therefore, wish to speak at some length. You will have heard of the rising of the Shinwaris and the attacks on Kabul by the inhabitants of Koh-i-Daman. The cause of such risings having occurred is due entirely to the machinations of the enemies of the Faith. Through the instrumentality of the Mullahs, who in reality are in the service of "Kafirs" despite their clerical turbans, the present troubles have arisen. These Satanic persons in the guise of priests have disseminated falsities amongst the masses which aim at the destruction of Afghanistan, creating, as they do, disunion in the nation and obstruction to all progress. Certain suggestions had been advanced by Shinwari Mullahs to which I agree knowing that they were an ignorant people. The proposals were sixteen in number. They included the re-establishment of the Friday holiday instead of Thursday: closing of girls school: reinstatement of Qazis in all courts of law: abolition of the "Nizamnamah"; abolishment of the "Identification register": reappointment of "Muhtasibs": reestablishment of the "Spiritual order system" and discipleship: observance of "purdah" by Afghan women: the recall of girls sent to Turkey to be educated, etc., etc. As I have said I agreed to the majority of these demands but as the rising was instigated by interested persons, who continued to egg them on, their rebellious activities did not cease towards me. As far as possible I refrained from taking any military action against them and sent conciliatory messages but those had no effect. Finally, I was compelled to use troops against them. I despatched Sher Ahmed Khan as "Rais-i-Tanzimiah". The Khugianis made requests to him to be supplied with arms and ammunition in order to enable them to suppress the Shinwaris. Sher Ahmed Khan placed a Holy Qoran in front of them and individually they swore on it that they were pro-Government. But having obtained the arms they turned them against us. Similarly Malik Jilani of Chapriar after obtaining arms rose in rebellion at Nimla, the Khugianis threw themselves against the Yawar and his force. The Mohmands who were on terms of enmity with the Shinwaris fired on our troops in the vicinity of Jalalabad. When the situation in the Eastern Province became so complicated I recalled Sher Ahmed Khan and replaced him by Ali Ahmed Jan. There is now some hope that a settlement will be arrived at in the Eastern Province through the efforts of a "Jirga".

You will have heard, too, of the Koh-i-Daman affair. Habibullah, Bacha-i-Saqao, together with his companion Saiyid Hussain, two notorious robbers, who, for the last three years have been causing trouble in the mountains, robbing and plundering travellers, on account of which Government have made repeated efforts to seize them, on hearing of the rising of the Shinwaris sent a message to Ali Ahmed Jan offering their personal services on condition that they would be pardoned. Ali Ahmed Jan communicated this to me on the telephone and asked for instructions. I ordered Ali Ahmed Jan to summon these two men to his own place and ascertain whether their offer was a genuine one or not. These two accompanied by one hundred and fifty of their fellow robbers took a solemn oath that they had repented of their past crimes and asked for provision to be made to them of arms and the restoration of their confiscated properties. Ali Ahmed Jan intimated to me that their repentance appeared sincere. I gave them one hundred and fifty magazine rifles and, since their properties had been sold by Government, compensated them by the payment of Rs. 30,000 (Afghani) in cash from the treasury. Utilizing this actual money and the very arms given by me they attacked Kabul. These people are utilizing the Qoran merely as an instrument for easy deception and I feel certain that the Holy Script will avenge itself on them. Moreover lies have been spread describing me as being anti-religion. Secret informers have told me that there was

an animus against me personally as King. So because of my love for the Afghan nation I desired to remove the possible cause of this fratricidal war and I have, therefore, voluntarily abdicated and my elder brother, the Moin-us-Saltanah, has received public allegiance from the citizens of Kabul and has ascended the throne.

As I knew that I was loved by my dear Kandaharis I have come to you to inform you of these things personally as such matters cannot adequately be conveyed by messages or "farmans". Now it is incumbent on you to send in your written allegiance to the Moin-us-Saltanah (cries of anguish and uproar). Do not be dismayed. Soyereignty has not departed from amongst you".

On the speech ending Mullah Abdul Wasi said "Your Majesty is right. We had sworn fealty to you and legally you had the right voluntarily to resign. We will now swear allegiance to the Moin-us-Saltanah as you have advised". But Qazi Abdush Shakur, who was the Chief Qazi, rising to his feet exclaimed "Oh men of Kandahar. Amanullah is our King. We do not recognise the Moin-us-Saltanah. Are you of my opinion or not." With one voice the audience replied that they were of the same opinion. Amanullah was annoyed at this unexpected move on the part of the Qazi and 'Abdul Karim, the Governor, brother of Qazi Abdush Shakur, in front of 'Amanullah said "You are a mad and foolish person". 'Amanullah was in a bad temper when he rose to break up the meeting.

Amanullah was anxious for news of Kabul but he had no means of obtaining information. From Ghazni, however, he was informed by the Hakim that the people of Ghazni had refused to give their allegiance to Inayatullah and that he himself was a prisoner in the Citadel.

CHAPTER VIII.

KANDAHAR -INAYATULLAH'S ARRIVAL. EVENTS IN MUKUR AND THE PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTURE TO HERAT.

Amanullah, after his arrival in Kandahar, continued to show great concern regarding the fate of Kabul and the possibilities and prospects of Inayatullah remaining on the throne. Only a very few days had elapsed when a telegram was received by Amanullah from Inayatullah addressed to "His Majesty" enquiring about his health and signed "Moin-us-Saltanah", Peshawar. Conjecture immediately arose as to whether the telegram had been sent to Peshawar from Kabul and had been transmitted from Peshawar to Kandahar or whether it pointed to the fact that Inayatullah himself had arrived in Peshawar. Those who held this last view, saw in the style of address "His Majesty" and in the sender's name, "Moin-us-Saltanah", sufficient proof to support their opinion. Surprise was, however, evinced as to how Inayatullah had, in such a short space of time, been able to reach Peshawar from Kabul. An urgent reply pre-paid telegram was despatched to Abdul Hakim Khan, the Afghan Trade Agent in Peshawar, enquiring as to the whereabouts of Inayatullah. It was apparent, however, soon after this that Inayatullah, together with the whole of his family, had been evacuated from Kabul in British aeroplanes. And that with him also had come Abdul Aziz, the War Minister, and Ahmed Ali Khan, the President of the Kabul Municipality.

On learning this news Amanullah schemed that he should be acknowledged again as King. His confidants, such as the Wazir-i-Darbar, Muhammad Yakub Khan, Abdul Karim Khan, the Governor of Kandahar, and Abdul Ahad Khan were told of Amanullah's real desires and they immediately began to disseminate propaganda on his behalf. Amanullah himself took no steps to advocate the abrogation of his adbication until Inayatullah actually arrived. Then a notice was promulgated enjoining all Kandahar to be present on the following day at the Salam Khanah at 10 o'clock. The people collected. Amanullah and Inayatullah entered the hall and sat on chairs. Amanullah ordered Abdul Aziz Khan to translate his Persian speech into Pushtu. Another chair was placed for Abdul Aziz Khan and Amanullah then spoke in the following words :—

"I have, on a previous occasion, informed you of the situation in Kabul. I brought my narrative up to a point where reference was made to the necessity of taking the oath of allegiance to Moin-us-Saltanah. God, however, ordained that, after my departure from Kabul, Bacha Saqao, and his forces gathered strength and the "Shahi Risala" and the handful of men in the Arq lost heart. Bacha Saqao desieged the fort for three days and through the influence of the Hazrat of Shor Bazar, Muhammad Siddiq Jan, the citizens of Kabul paid homage to Bacha Saqao. Finally, through the intercession of the Hazrat and Sardar Muhammad Usman Khan, the Moin-us-Saltanah and his family, together with the War Minister left for Peshawar in British aeroplanes. I was informed of their arrival in Peshawar. They have now arrived safely in Kandahar. What we had planned has had an effect not contemplated. I abdicated in favour of my brother in order to avoid further bloodshed. Now that Bacha Saqao the notorious brigand from Koh-i-Daman has usurped the sacred throne of Afghanistan I shall shed the last drop of my blood in vanquishing and destroying the robbers. I feel convinced that not a single Afghan, especially a Durani or a Ghilzai, or even a Hazara, will submit to the disgrace of Bacha Saqao's rule. The sovereignty must remain in the hands of an Afghan. Moin-us-Saltanah, my elder brother, is present. Do you take the oath of allegiance to him or to someone else? I am prepared to place my personal services at his disposal. But the destruction of the brigands who have blackened the face of Afghans is a point of honour both for you and for me."

The Moin-us-Saltanah rose and said "His Majesty offered the throne to me two months ago when the present trouble first arose. I then declined to accept it but finally yielded when I realized that, unless I agreed to be King, even if it were only for three days, His Majesty would not have been able to get away in safety from Kabul. On this account and for this reason alone I accepted the Kingship. Now that we are amongst our own dear people and the time has arrived when we should serve our country I am of opinion that no person is better qualified to bear this heavy responsibility than His Majesty himself and I herewith tender to him my resignation."

At this juncture all who were present began to weep, the War Minister being especially affected. Then Qazi Abdush Shakur got up and and taking hold of Amanullah's hand said "I renew my allegiance." Mullah Abdul Wasi tried to indicate that it was illegal to renew allegiance to a former ruler once that ruler had abdicated and a great portion of the nation had paid homage to his successor, but his words were drowned in the rush of men who came forward to seize Amanullah's hand. The only persons who had heard Abdul Wasi's words were Amanullah and his Ministers. He trembled in his shoes for his indiscretion but Amanullah realized that he had spoken as he had only because of the grudge he bore for having been imprisoned on several occasions and Amanullah ignored the incident altogether.

On the next day His Majesty held a conference with his Ministers and the Governor of Kandahar in the Salam Khanah at which the following appointment were made. Abdul Aziz was appointed War Minister in Kandahar with instruction to commence recruiting: Ghulam Siddiq to administer foreign affairs and, if necessary, to go abroad: Abdul Ahad in co-operation with the Governor to be in charge of propaganda. Hassan Jan was placed in charge of the Intelligence Branch: Mirza Muhammad Umar Khan was made personal Secretary to the King. Differences of opinion arose on the appointment of Secretary to the assembly. Both Abdul Aziz and Ghulam Siddiq insisted, with some heat, that the person best qualified for the appointment was Mirza Ali Ahmed, Mohmand, who was then in Kandahar as Frontier Officer and Mirza Ali Ahmed was selected.

Written instructions were issued sanctioning the establishment of the various departments and the necessary grants for their upkeep were sanctioned. Thus the wheels of Government began to move and to work.

Abdul Ahad notified officials and the people that Amanullah had again become King on the abdication of Inayatullah and that Kabul had fallen to Bacha-i-Saqao. Men were selected to tour the country and to explain the situation. Capable people were selected as Hakims to fill vacant appointments.

Amongst all the ministers the only one who worked sincerely and honestly was Abdul Ahad. The rest worked only half heartedly. For example one Muhammad Akbar, an agent of Hassan Jan whose number was 6, made reports similar to the following, namely, that the Herati Ghund had marched through the Kandahar bazaar with its band playing amidst intense excitement. The man was not threatened on this account but continued to draw his salary. Hassan Jan's attitude was one of complete indifference. Abdul Aziz lined his own pocket through purchases of war material and equipment likewise the Wazir-i-Darbar.

About this time a postal carrier sowar arrived from Abdul Hamid, the Hakim-i-Ala of Farah, with a letter for the Governor of Kandahar. It contained a request that the King in Kabul should be immediately informed, either by telephone or by telegram, that the people of Farah had risen at the instigation of some mullahs. That one "Ilaqadar," his clerk, and the Census Clerk had been killed and with the mullahs leading and banners flying the masses had moved on the Hakim-i-Ala's residence and that in consequence he, Abdul Hamid, took refuge in the house of a "Khan". That the Mustaufi" had also hidden himself and that the Superintendent of the Revenue Office had been taken and put to death. That in order to quell the disturbance Abdul Hamid had called Ghund Mishar Abdul Rauf Khan and

his mounted detachment from Chaknasur. Their arrival had the necessary effect and the rebels had dispersed. Abdul Hamid continued that disturbances had ceased and that the ring-leaders were desirous of being pardoned. He stated that the ringleaders had been given assurances by himself in view of the delicate situation and ended by asking for instructions as to how he should act.

As Amanullah was in Kandahar the letter was handed over to him. A conference was called and the matter discussed. The ostensible cause of the trouble was on account of the census but in reality news of the Shinwari rising and the siege of the Arq in Kabul had reached Farah and the people in Farah, too, had risen against the Government. As a result of the conference Amanullah decided, (his decision receiving the unanimous support of the Assembly) to send a conciliatory "farman" to all the Khans and to the public of Farah by the hand of Mullah Muhammad Yakub Khan, Nurzai, an influential old resident of Farah, then living in Kandahar stating that "Detailed reports of the events which have taken place in Farah have reached His Majesty who realizes that the blame lies solely on the Hakim-i-Ala Abdul Hamid. because of his mismanagement of affairs. He is being recalled and enquiries into his conduct will be instituted. He is being replaced by Muhammad Anwar Khan, Nurzai, inhabitant of Pusht-i-Rud, who is of the same tribe as the Farah is and formerly the military officer commanding Farah. Despatch a representative body of twenty men to Kandahar to interview me. Their expenses will be met by Government. Further instructions accompany the newly appointed Hakim. This "farman" is being carried by Mullah Muhammad Yakub Khan one of your own Elders for your reassurance." Mullah Muhammad Yakub was given Rs. 1,000, Afghani, as a present and was provided with a motor car to take him to Farah. "Farmans" for Muhammad Anwar Khan were despatched by another car to Pusht-i-Rud. Orders were given him to proceed to Farah with as little delay as possible. His instructions were as follows :--

(1) to conciliate the people;

(2) to recruit men up to a strength of approximately three Kandaks, arms and equipment for whom would be despatched from Herat;

(3) to remit all cash in the Farah treasury to Kandahar keeping only sufficient to cover three months' working expenses;

(4) to make arrangements for the maintenance of speedy communications between Farah and Girishk from which place similar arrangements would be made to Kandahar by the Governor of Kandahar.

(5) to take measures to protect the telegraph line Herat to Farah and to make arrangements to keep it always in working order;

(6) to repeat to Kandahar in cipher all messages arriving in Farah from Herat.

(7) to obtain possession of the persons of two or three ringleaders of the rebellion and to blow them from a gun "so that justice be done and tranquility re-established."

Muhammad Anwar Khan left for Farah and carried out the instructions given to him except as regards No. 1 and No. 7. He considered that the first was impracticable and would lead to misgivings being entertained as to the possible danger to the persons of the 20 representatives. As regards the second he was of opinion that considering the situation in Farah the execution of a few leaders would merely tend to aggravate the difficulties of the situation. Amanullah approved of Muhammad Anwar's suggestions and peace once again reigned in Farah.

While Amanullah was still in Kabul he had sent to Herat by car one Tuti Shah Khan, a Ghund Mishar, with orders to conduct to Kabul from Herat one Ghund consisting of artillery, 3 Kandaks of infantry and cavalry. Some 1,300 men had left Herat in accordance with these orders and had

passed through Kalat-i-Ghilzai. On his way to Kandahar His Majesty had met them at Robat Sar-i-Asp and, considering that Inayatullah was to continue as King in Kabul, he had ordered them to proceed there. On Amanullah, resuming the Kingship and owing to the change in the situation he sent telephonic instructions for the return of these troops to Kandahar. They turned and came back as far as Mukur.

In Mukur the attitude of the Khans had undergone a complete change. They realized that Amanullah was losing ground. Their source of income from the collection of revenue had dried up when Amanullah had decreed that as Maliks and "Qaryadars" they were to interest themselves no longer in the collection of revenue. They, too, considered the possibilities of rebellion and they commenced to enlist the sympathy of the Taraks and the Ali Khels. The scales were weighted against Amanullah by the advent of an aeroplane from Kabul which dropped leaflets announcing the fact that Bacha Saqao had ascended the throne of Afghanistan with the consent of the Mullahs and the concurrence of the people. The heretical acts of Amanullah were also catalogued. Considering the moment to be propitious the inhabitants of Mukur immediately sent in their allegiance to Bacha Saqao.

Seeing the chance of obtaining money and arms they commenced to play with Amanullah. They seized Abdur Rahman, who was then in charge of the telephone in Mukur, and threatened him with his life if he did not agree to what they would order him to do. Yielding, he was forced to telephone to Kandahar the following message which purported to emanate from the leaders of the Ali Khel. "We are sincere and loyal but the Taraks are a doubtful quantity. There is no Hakim in Mukur. In order to save the treasury and magazine from being plundered by the Taraks orders are requested that all arms, ammunition and money in Mukur be made over to us for which we will furnish a formal receipt." Amanullah replied that an answer would be given on the next day. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Kandak Mishar, who during the previous year had been the Sarhaddar and who was then in Kandahar, was selected as Hakim. He was despatched immediately by motor to Mukur with orders to issue arms and ammunition should he consider it necessary. Abdul Ghaffar arrived in Mukur quite unconscious of the fate which awaited him. As soon as he alighted from his car he was seized and made prisoner. He was threatened with death if he failed to hand over the money in the treasury as well as all arms. Abdul Ghaffar was forced to agree but only eighty rifles were found in the arsenal and 12,000 rupees in the treasury. Not satisfied with the small haul made, Abdul Ghaffar was dragged by the insurgents to the telephone and was ordered to ask for the immediate despatch of 100 infantry in motor cars to reinforce Mukur in anticipation of an advance by Saqavis from Ghazni and that the request was in accordance with the wishes of the people of Mukur.

The message reached Amanullah at 12 o'clock at night. Abdul Ahad Khan, Munshi Ali Ahmed Khan, Firqa Mishar Nek Muhammad Khan with 100 men and two machine guns were ordered to proceed to Mukur. Their instructions were to ascertain the movements of the Saqavis in the vicinity of Ghazni and to report what defensive arrangements were necessary at Mukur. Mukur was informed that this force would be arriving at about 12 o'clock. So, having cut the telephone line and having armed themselves, the people of Mukur proceeded to the road with the intention of intercepting the cars and seizing the arms of the troops.

The cars left Kandahar at 8 A.M. At 12 o'clock they arrived in Kalat. Here the men had some food whilst three of the larger cars proceeded on their way to Mukur. The next car to follow was the one in which Abdul Ahad and the Munshi were travelling and behind them came three lorries carrying troops and the car of Nek Muhammad.

On nearing Mukur two of the first three cars were attacked near Aghujan by Aminullah's men and by Abdul Hakim Khan (Sahol Khel) and Haji Ghulam Muhammad Khan (Nauroz Khel). The third car turned and met Abdul Ahad's car in the vicinity of Pashokand. Meanwhile the remainder

of the cars arrived. In the car which managed to escape there were twelve soldiers; three were dead and three wounded. By this time it was evening. The Hakim of Kalat, Faizullah Khan, Mama Khan, a Shahjoi Wazir, and Khair Gul Khan, Tokhi, were present on the spot. A consultation ensued and it was decided to return to Kalat-i-Ghilzai and from there to report the matter to Kandahar by telephone. All, therefore, turned back to Kalat. The wounded were sent on to Kandahar but on arrival were found to have died through exposure on account of which great nervousness prevailed.

Abdul Ahad reported the matter by telephone and made a request for the Herati Ghund with which he proposed to teach the people of Mukur a salutary lesson. The Herati Ghund was ordered to march to Kalat. This Ghund asked that the order be countermanded and pointed out that they had been on the move for quite three months and that only two days had elapsed since they had returned to Kandahar from the neighbourhood of Ghazni and in consequence they were tired out. Their request had to be acceded to and as an alternative Sahibzada Muhammad Umar Jan was despatched to Mukur to argue with the people there. This action was taken on the advice of Ghulam Siddiq who was a disiciple of Umar Jan's. Umar Jan went as far as Aghujan and interviewed some of the mullahs of Mukur. He, instead of attempting to pacify them, increased their hostility and returned and reported that all his endeavours had fallen on deaf ears owing to their ignorance and that he had with difficulty escaped from their clutches and had managed to save the government car. Umar Jan arrived in Kandahar at the same time as did Abdul Ahad and the Munshi, Ali Ahmed. The situation was explained to Amanullah who immediately moved towards Kalat all the troops available in Kandahar and also the "Kaumi" lashkar that had been raised. This column was placed under the command of Ghund Mishar Muhammad Akram Khan, Muhammadzai, a resident of Kandahar. Meanwhile the Herati Ghund was kept in Kandahar and enquiries were being made as to the real reasons behind their refusal to march to Kalat when ordered to do so.

The next cause for alarm was the report from the Hakim of Kalat that the loyalty of the Kandahari troops in Kalat was doubtful and that serious fighting on their part was out of the question. Amanullah ordered Abdul Karim, the Governor, Firqa Mishar Nek Muhammad Khan, Abdul Ali, Barakzai, Saiyid Jan, Muhammadzai, Karim Jan, Popalzai and a few other important persons to proceed to Kalat by car and to ascertain the cause of the disaffection of the Kandahari troops and to try to influence them to give their whole hearted support to Amanullah's cause. Their investigations led them to the conclusion that Ghund Mishar Muhammad Akram was the root cause of the trouble. They discovered that he was working in collusion with Bacha-i-Saqao and had sent his second-in-command, Niaz Muhammad Khan, Andar, to the enemy with the intimation that Kalat was prepared to surrender without opposition and without firing a shot. For appearance sake Niaz Muhammad had been reported as having deserted.

Seeing that his guilt had been discovered Muhammad Akram, during the night, visited the barracks taking with him a Quran. He told the men that Abdul Karim and the others had come to Kalat expressly to throw doubts on his integrity and on their loyalty. They should, therefore, devise some plan whereby they might escape from this dishonour and from subsequent disciplinary action. Through his arguments the men agreed to his plan which was that the troops should come down from the upper citadel, fully armed, into the Koti Bagh, seize the Governor of Kandahar and the others with him, handcuff them and drag them up to the citadel. He would then intercede on the arrested party's behalf whereupon he, too, should be seized and placed under arrest. Then Abdul Karim, his brother Abdul Ali and Firqa Mishar Nek Muhammad Khan should be taken out and shot. The remainder of the party would thereupon submit as a matter of course. This having been accomplished the mutineers were to proceed to the local treasury, loot it and start for Kandahar where they were to march straight

to the treasury, plunder it and then openly mutiny. Muhammad Akram assured the conspirators that a large section of the army in Kandahar was on his side and that messages of sympathy had been received by him even from the garrison of Herat. He also informed them that the citizens of Kandahar were prepared to pay homage to him. He pointed out that this was his suggestion as a way out of the impasse. The rank and file agreed.

On the following morning at about 8 o'clock whilst the Governor of Kandahar was telephoning to Amanullah, the soldiery rushed into the room and, as pre-arranged, seized Abdul Karim as well as the Firqa Mishar and the Khans and carried them off to the citadel bare-headed and handcuffed. Amanullah enquired as to the reason of the sudden breaking off of the telephonic conversation and was informed of what had taken place by Muhammad Ibrahim, the telephonist in Kalat. On hearing of the events Amanullah immediately ordered the Superintendent of the Kandahar Central Telephone Office to proceed and take over sole charge of the Kandahar Exchange and to clear the premises of all telephonists present in order to enable Amanullah to talk privately to Kalat. This was a precautionary measure to prevent any telephonic messages being sent from Kalat to Kandahar being intercepted by telephonists who would broadcast the news from Kalat possibly precipitating thereby serious disorders and rioting in Kandahar itself.

In Kalat the pre-arranged plans of Muhammad Akram had been given effect to except the shooting of the Governor, his brother and Nek Muhammad. Despite their promises to the contrary the shooting of their kinsmen was not carried out owing to the large percentage of the troops also being Barakzais. Abdul Karim, realizing that Muhammad Akram had planned the coup shouted to the troops "How many men and haw many women are amongst you". The soldiers replied "Perhaps you wish to save yourself at the last hour by feigning madness. But you will not escape." Abdul Karim answered "No, I am not mad, I am speaking only the plain unvarnished truth I and my brother and Nek Muhammad all three Barakzais are being put to death by the other sections of the Durranis the Nurzais, Popalzais Alizais, etc. So it is obvious that there is not one man amongst the whole crowd of Barakzais here. When I asked how many women there were I referred to the number of Barakzais". As soon as he had finished speaking about 300 men, all Barakzais, separated themselves from the rest and stated that they would support the arrested persons. A serious split was thus formed in the ranks of the conspirators. Some of the Khans present began also to use their persuasion on the troops, who now had become undetermined, and eventually everyone was released on arrangements being arrived at whereby the money in the treasury was divided amongst the troops. This latter event was not disclosed to Amanullah. The Naib-ul-Hukuma who had realized the gravity of the situation, himself ordered the opening of the treasury and himself disbursed the Rs. 68,000 which it contained to the troops and gave formal receipt for the same over his own signature.

After the disbursement of the money the troops held a ceremonial parade accompanied by the military band, in honour of Abdul Karim, brought out the Governor's charger marched in front of him from the Upper Citadel down to the town, put the Governor and Firqa Mishar and the Khans into their motor cars and raised cheers for Amanullah. The band playing the Afghan National Anthem as the cars moved towards Kandahar and the troops then returned to their barracks.

The Governor of Kandahar arrived in Kandahar at 8 P.M. He at once proceeded to the Seraglio to see His Majesty. There he found a few Ministers including Abdul Ahad, Muhammad Yakub and Abdul Aziz in conversation with the King. Abdul Karim made a full report of the events which had taken place in Mukur. Amanullah, after hearing his report remarked that Abdul Karim had saved himself by emptying the public treasury and that it was a waste of money as in reality no one would have

killed him. The Naib-ul-Hukumah retorted that his life was not one whit less valuable than the public treasury. Amanullah then said "well no use crying over spilt milk". They then all had dinner together after which the officials took their leave. During that night Amanullah decided definitely to go to Herat from where he determined to proceed either to Russia or to Turkey.

Representatives of the tribes in the Southern and Eastern Provinces and also of the independent border tracts now began to arrive in Kandahar, amongst whom were Aminullah Khan, Abdul Jabbar Khan (Jabbar Khel); Muhammad Hassan Khan, son of Sardar Khan, Mohmand; Malik Ghazi Khan, Afridi; Ismatullah Khan, son of Mir Zaman Khan; Dari Khan, Mangal and Qalandar Khan, the Jaji representative. All of them came with assurances of loyalty from their tribes and asked for instructions. Amanullah ordered his Personal Secretary to prepare the necessary "farmans" for his signature. Ghulam Siddiq was ordered to give each man a sufficient sum to defray his expenses and to present them to Amanullah prior to their departure for their homes. Aminullah Jan and Abdul Jabbar took with them "farmans" for Mahmud, Akhundzada of Tirah; Sher Agha; and Saiyid Anwar Shah, Afridi. They also took some few blank "farmans" for the Khans of the Jabbar Khel. Aminullah Khan was likewise given a "farman" for Nadir Khan details of which will be given in another chapter. Similarly Muhammad Hassan Khan, Mohmand, received "farmans" for the Khans of the Mohmands, the Shinwaris, Firqa Mishar Muhammad Gul Khan, Naib Salar Abdul Wakil Khan, etc.: Malik Ghazi Khan was provided with "farmans" for the Afridis. Mir Zaman's, son with "farmans" for Malik Muhassil Khan, Mohmand, other notables and the Safis.

Aminullah and Abdul Jabbar Khan, were each paid Rs. 6,000 (Afghani). Muhammad Hassan Khan Rs. 6,000. Mir Zaman Khan's son Rs. 4,000. Malik Ghazi Khan Rs. 2,000. After taking leave of Amanullah these persons returned to their homes *via* Chaman and Quetta with the exception of Mir Zaman's son who remained in Kandahar and from there forwarded the "farmans" entrusted to him by the hand of one of his servants to the Eastern Province. The general tenor of these "farmans" was as follows:—

"You patriotic Afghan tribesmen must have heard that Bacha Saqao and other robbers from Koh-i-Daman have taken possession of the Capital of Afghanistan and intend to rule over the Afghan tribes. As in the eyes of the world this event casts a slur on the good name of Afghans in general it is the duty of every Afghan to leave no stone unturned to repel and destroy this robber gang. I, therefore, inform you that you should be ready with all your lashkars to attack Kabul. In a subsequent 'farman' I will acquaint you with the date of my departure from Kandahar in order that Kabul may be surrounded on all sides and the robber band exterminated.".

On the third day after the departure of these emissaries of the various tribes, Amanullah held a special conference at which he stated that as the Kandaharis had not come forward with any enthusiasm for his cause and as their leaders appeared to be insincere and slow to provide men and since what troops he had appeared loath to fight it appeared to him a wise action were he to leave Kandahar and proceed to Herat. If, when in Herat he was convinced of the sincerity of the Heratis, well and good, but if he subsequently realized that they, too, were not whole heartedly for his cause he would quit Afghanistan and proceed to a foreign country. After some discussion on this subject Amanullah convinced the conference of the soundness of his views. It was suggested, however, that the matter should be referred to a Council of the Khans of Kandahar and that their views should be consulted in order to avoid any trouble arising.

Abdul Karim Khan, the Governor of Kandahar, sent in his written resignation and expressed a wish to be permitted, together with all his family to proceed to Herat with His Majesty.

On the following day at 2 o'clock Kandahari Khans and other leading men including members of the Representative Assembly presented themselves before Amanullah who spoke to them in the following words: —

"I see that my dear Kandaharis are boiling over with enthusiasm for my cause. I am leaving behind in Kandahar, Abdul Aziz Khan to act as my deputy while I proceed to Herat to arouse the enthusiasm of the Heratis on my behalf and also in order that instructions may be sent from there to Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, Katagan, etc. I will return to Kandahar when opportunity offers. Abdul Karim, who has asked to be permitted to resign his appointment as Governor, will accompany me to Herat as he is familiar with the affairs of that place. Abdul Aziz will take over the duties of Governor."

Amanullah's proposals were readily agreed to by the Kandaharis and their approval was attested by them. The "farman" appointing Abdul Aziz as Regent with full powers in both civil and military matters was prepared and Amanullah made preparations for his departure to Herat.

Ghulam Siddiq was sent on ahead to Herat with instructions to have repairs effected where necessary to the road and the bridges. He was also instructed to use all his influence in Herat to keep up a spirit of loyalty amongst the troops and citizens. Orders were given to him to remit, either to Russia or Meshed as much money as was possible from the Herat treasury under the pretence that such money was intended for the purchase of arms. A "farman" was given to Ghulam Siddiq which authorized the Governor of Herat to obey implicitly all orders given by Ghulam Siddiq and to carry out his wishes as if he were the King.

Supplies of petrol were sent to Gaugardan and Girishk in lorries. From Farah, where there was a supply, petrol was ordered to be despatched to Bakwa and Subzawar.

Mahmud Beg Tarzi, his wife and Nur-us-Siraj, who was pregnant, were sent to Herat in two aeroplanes, one of which had arrived from Russia and the other from Persia. Nur-us-Siraj was provided with a "farman" authorizing her to draw 2,000 Russian gold roubles from the Herat treasury to defray her expenses to Tashkent.

As soon as the King had decided to leave Kandahar Muhammad Yakub Khan, Minister of Court, despatched his family with his brother, to Herat.

Amongst Amanullah's entourage there was one man who was embittered at the projected departure for Herat, Abdul Ahad, Wardak. His family had been left behind in the Wardak country and he realized that were Amanullah to leave Afghanistan the position of Bacha Saqao would be considerably strengthened and that the probabilities were that his family would be arrested and imprisoned. He made several attempts to prevent the decisive step being taken by Amanullah to leave Kandahar for Herat.

The 5th of Ramzan (16th February) was definitely selected as the date of the King's departure.

Before the date fixed for Amanullah's departure a letter was received by Abdul Ahad from his son, Gul Ahmed Khan, from Ghazni, which intimated that, from reliable information, it was apparent that Bacha Saqao's position in Kabul was insecure; that the Eastern Province was antagonistic to his regime; that Nadir Khan was raising "lashkars" in the Southern Province; that the Tagaois had risen against Bacha Saqao; that the Saqavi garrison in Ghazni was not more than 150 men and in Mukur not more than 60; that all the tribes, Tajiks, Hazaras and Andars, in the Ghazni District, were loyal to Amanullah and that the mere appearance only was necessary of one Kandak from Kandahar to force the surrender of both Ghazni and Mukur.

Having previously enlisted the support of the War Minister, Abdul Ahad took this letter to the King. Discussion then took place at which Abdul Ahad and Abdul Aziz argued that Amanullah would be advised to cancel his plans for leaving Kandahar for Herat and to plan an advance instead on Kabul and to lead his troops in person. It was pointed out that

former Kings of Afghanistan had also led their troops in battle and they insisted that were Amanullah to do so there was every hope that the venture would terminate successfully and that Kabul would be retaken. Amanullah, however, argued that he had two reasons for not agreeing with their suggestions. The first was that the Afghan nation had destroyed his labours of ten years during which period he had worked for the good of his nation and he had in consequence lost all ambition to rule over such ignorant people, especially in view of the fact that virulent propaganda was still continuing to be spread against him. He considered that he should depart voluntarily for Herat on the day arranged rather than be forced to go there later on with his cup of bitterness full to overflowing. Secondly he pointed out that during the past three months it had become patent that the Kandaharis were merely prevaricating and that no response was being made to his call for men and that even those men who had been enlisted were not prepared to fight and that there was a shortage of ammunition, guns, etc.

Abdul Ahad and Abdul Aziz, in reply, stated that it was obvious that the Afghan nation had lost faith in Bacha Saqao and had become nauseated by his tyrannies and oppression and had turned once again towards Amanullah. Regarding war material they stated that, in their opinion, there was ample and that further supplies would be certain to fall into Amanullah's hands as his advance progressed. They argued that the poor response made by Kandahar to provide men was due, in part, to the fact that Abdul Karim, the Governor, and his brother, Abdul Ali, had been taking bribes but that as the arrangements for recruiting were now in Abdul Aziz's hands, improvement in this respect was bound to follow and, in part, to the realization of the Kandaharis that the King was inclined towards proceeding to Herat and from there to some foreign country.

The two ministers were of opinion that were the King to make a public speech definitely indicating that he was planning to march on Kabul, the sentiments of the Kandaharis would immediately harden to the King's cause and a response would immediately follow.

Amanullah was won over and on the next day, which was a Friday, he made a speech in the Khirqa Sharif mosque which was as follows:—

"I am determined to retake Kabul and I myself will march forward, alone, if necessary. I hope my dear fellow tribesmen will follow me." Great enthusiasm ensued and a great shout went up that Kandahar was ready to serve and to sacrifice their lives in Amanullah's cause.

"Farmans" were now prepared intimating to officials and tribesmen *en route* that Amanullah's intention was to march on Kabul.

Ghulam Siddiq was informed that Amanullah's visit to Herat was cancelled and that the march on Kabul would commence on the 26th March. Ghulam Siddiq was ordered to proceed immediately to Moscow in order to make arrangements to obtain from the Soviet, as promised, 10 fighting planes, 4 armoured cars and 10,000 rifles. The above material was to be despatched *via* Herat. Early delivery of the aircraft was to be stressed.

A "farman" was despatched to the Hakim-i-Ala of Farah ordering the despatch to Kandahar of Abdul Rauf Khan and his Ghund to join His Majesty's forces marching on Kabul. Orders were also issued to the Governor of Herat directing that the Herati Ghund was similarly to be sent and that double marches were to be made. Firqa Mishar Abdur Rahman was, by this "farman" appointed G. O. C. Herat and sanction was conveyed for the raising of a second Ghund to replace the one sent to Kandahar.

A "farman" was also sent to Abdul Aziz, the Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif, and to Firqa Mishar Muhammad Iklil Khan instructing them to divide the Mazar garrison into three parts; one to be retained in Mazar, one to be sent towards Bamian and Ghorband *via* Haibak and Kamard and the third towards Andarab, Panjshir and Kohistan *via* Kattagan. These last two portions to be concentrated at their destinations by the 30th March and to await further orders. Orders were also issued to pay to the

Russian Consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif the sum of ten lakhs of rupees which the Russian Consulate would remit to the Herat treasury for payment to His Majesty.

A "farman" was also despatched to Gul Ahmed Khan in Ghazni directing him to purchase and collect supplies sufficient for 50,000 men by the 4th April when His Majesty expected to arrive in Ghazni.

Abdul Hakim Khan, the Hakim-i-Ala of the Southern Province, was also directed to send a contingent of 15,000 armed tribesmen to Ghazni by the 4th April.

His Majesty also intimated that he would carry out an inspection of the local contingents of Kandahar on the 17th March and that he would then make arrangements for the distribution of arms, etc.

Muhammad Yakub, the Minister of Court, was ordered to make the necessary arragements for the march and was entrusted with the raising and recruitment for the Shahi Risala and the provision for them of horses and arms.

Abdul Ahad was ordered to march with 3 Kandahari Kandaks and the Herati Ghund to Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

Muhammad Akram, Ghund Mishar in Kalat, was summoned to Kandahar and was shot for treachery. Ghund Mishar Pir Muhammad Khan, Tara Khel, who had arrived in Kandahar from the Eastern Province, was appointed as Commandant of the Kandahari troops and ordered to accompany Abdul Ahad.

CHAPTER IX.

Russian and Persian interest in the affairs of Amanullah. Ghulam Nabi's advance from the North.

Amanullah's Minister in Moscow, Ghulam Nabi, on hearing of Amanullah's flight from Kabul, wrote a long letter on the possibilities of enlisting Russian aid for Amanullah. The letter was entrusted to Ghulam Dastgir, a Kandak Mishar in the Afghan Air Force and an Afghan student, who had gone to Russia for training. Ghulam Dastgir travelled *via* Herat to Kandahar. Ghulam Nabi stated in this letter that the Soviet Government were prepared to assist Amanullah by means of money, arms, ammunition, air craft, guns and troops. Ghulam Nabi asked for further instructions and concluded his letter by saying "I am despatching Ghulam Dastgir as our diplomatic courier as he is a trustworthy person and I will await his return with commands from Your Majesty for continuing and concluding negotiations with the Soviet.".

Ghulam Siddiq was still in Kandahar when Ghulam Dastgir arrived. Ghulam Siddiq delayed a reply being sent to his brother, Ghulam Nabi, although the latter had expressly asked for an early answer. Ghulam Siddiq had two reasons for this procrastination. He desired to go himself to Russia, on any pretext, in order to extricate himself from the difficulties surrounding Amanullah. Also it was contrary to Ghulam Siddiq's personal interests that the Russians should be brought to the help of Amanullah.

All Ghulam Dastgir's prayers for an early answer fell on the deaf ears of Ghulam Siddiq—the Foreign Minister. Ghulam Dastgir against his own desires, was forced to remain in Kandahar where he was the guest of the Governor.

Soon after Ghulam Dastgir's arrival, a Russian Junker landed in Kandahar with three passengers—a pilot, a mechanic and an official from the Russian Foreign Ministry. The ostensible reason of the Russian official's visit was the reiteration of the proposals for help being afforded by Russia that had been made through Ghulam Nabi and the conveyance of a small wireless set, a gift from the Soviet Government to Amanullah. The real reason, however, of the visit was to ascertain the political situation in Kandahar and to gauge the loyalty of the Kandaharis to Amanullah.

The wireless was installed and the Russians communicated with their own Legation in Kabul. Finding, however, that the political situation was unfavourable to Amanullah and realizing also that Ghulam Siddiq was averse to any strengthening of Amanullah's position the wireless was dismantled on the grounds that there was no traffic to justify its maintenance.

Amanullah merely informed the Russians that, after the melting of the snow between Kandahar and Kabul and Kabul and Mazar, Ghulam Siddiq, his Foreign Minister, would proceed to Moscow and would then initiate regular negotiations. The Russians then left Kandahar.

The visit of the Russian plane had a deleterious effect on Kandahar. In its arrival the Kandaharis saw the possibility that Kandahar would be eventually handed over to the Russians and discussion over this question was general amongst the common people. When the Russians departed, however, the matter was forgotten.

The Persians, too, were taking an active interest in the affairs of Afghanistan. A letter was received from Muhammad Yakub, Afghan Visa Officer, Sistan, stating that he had information to the effect that Riza Shah had wired to the Governor General in Meshed that the Persians were prepared to come to the help of their co-religionists in Afghanistan and that a communication in that sense had been despatched to Amanullah in Kandahar. After this letter came a second despatched from Tehran by Sultan Ahmed Khan, the Afghan Ambassador, carried by a mounted courier from Herat. It said "The Persian Government, apparently, wish

to come forward with a proposal to help Afghanistan. Their real intention, however, is to bring about the end of Amanullah's regime. Moreover they are bent on regaining possession of Herat. Under the pretext of helping Afghanistan and on convincing you they will send their troops to Herat. They will foment trouble on the Afghan-Persian border and utilize it as a 'Casus belli' knowing that no help could be despatched against them to Herat. Beware, and do not be hoodwinked by their show of sympathy.".

Almost at the same time a Persian aeroplane arrived in Kandahar bringing one, Muhammad Khan. By some it was said that he was a Colonel. Some said he was the Editor of a newspaper. This man brought with him a proposal on the part of Persia to afford help to Amanullah. In view of the information already received from Tehran he was not singled out for any mark of especial consideration. He was accommodated in a common building and was watched.

Only two days elapsed before he was handed the reply to the message conveyed by him. Its purport was that while thanking Persia for the proffered help there was no present need for it. Muhammad Khan departed. A "farman" was then despatched to the Governor of Herat to pay special attention to the frontier tracts adjoining Persia and to prevent any acts of aggression being committed on Persians soil by the Hazaras, Jamshedis, etc., in order to deny the Persians any grounds for complaint and so to prevent the utilization of an adverse situation to benefit themselves.

Ghulam Siddiq was then sent to Herat. After staying in Herat for a short time he proceeded to Moscow. Amanullah anxiously awaited news from Ghulam Siddiq that Russia was agreed to render him assistance by the provision of aeroplanes, etc. Ghulam Siddiq never communicated with Amanullah after he had left Herat and great was Amanullah's disappointment.

Meanwhile the pro-Bacha Saqao party in Mazar-i-Sharif had seized Abdul Aziz, the Governor, who was brother to Ghulam Siddiq and had commenced to move towards Kabul to the assistance of Habibullah. When this information was received by Ghulam Siddiq he and his brother commenced to negotiate with the Soviet Government. The First Secretary to the Afghan Legation in Moscow was despatched to Turkey to their brother, Ghulam Jilani. He was asked to proceed at once to Moscow with all the Afghan students then undergoing training in Turkey and Ghulam Jilani arrived in Moscow with eighty Afghan students. At a conference held by the three brothers it was decided to ask Russia to render the help that had been proferred. It was decided that Ghulam Siddiq should remain in Moscow and that Ghulam Nabi was to launch an attack on Mazar-i-Sharif. Twenty of the Afghan students together with as many Afghans as possible from Moscow, Tashkent, Samarkand and Bokhara were to accompany Ghulam Nabi. These latter were to be obtained through the influence of the Soviet Government and were to be concentrated in the tracts inhabited by Afghan Turkomans preparatory to a descent being made on Mazar-i-Sharif. Ghulam Jilani, it was decided, should conduct the remaining Afghan students to Kandahar *via* Herat.

The Soviet provided 1,500 men consisting of refugees from Afghanistan, labourers, etc., all of whom were Afghan subjects. Russia supplied the war equipment, supplied a rifle to each man, provided 9 machine guns and sent a consignment of 2,500 rifles to Herat. In addition a sum of two lakhs of rupees was placed by the Soviet Government with Abdul Majid Khan a merchant of Herat for the use of Ghulam Nabi.

Ghulam Nabi crossed the River Oxus and entered the Akcheh district. Here he raised a force of mounted men through the instrumentality of Khalifa Qizil Ayaq, who is the leading man of the Turkomans, augmented by Afghans of Hajdah Nahr and the followers of Ghulam Rasul Khan, Ishakzai. The total number of Ghulam Nabi's force was approximately 8,000. With this force he moved on Mazar-i-Sharif.

Khwaja Ata Muhammad Khan of Kohistan, who was the Saqavi Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif considering himself to be too weak to offer opposition fled. Mazar surrendered automatically to Ghulam Nabi who, for several years, had been its commandant. Mirza Muhammad Qasim of Mazar, a relation of Bacha Saqao, also fled. Ghulam Nabi then took over the administration of Mazar and appointed as officials sympathisers with his cause. Ghulam Nabi informed the inhabitants of Kattagan that Mazar had been occupied by him and they also agreed to submit to him.

A telegraphic report was despatched by Ghulam Nabi to Herat in which he asked for instructions from Amanullah. The report also stated that he had organised five well armed Kandaks in addition to the existing garrison of Mazar and that the whole of the Mazar Province was loyal to the backbone. Amanullah received this report in the neighbourhood of Ghazni and ordered Ghulam Nabi to march on Kohistan. Ghulam Nabi with his mixed force comprising the detachment from Russia, Afghans and Turkomans began his advance. He was well served with artillery and aircraft and he was making satisfactory progress when Amanullah, defeated, abandoned Afghanistan. Ghulam Nabi, on the eve of victory, but now fearing discomfiture, dispersed his force and announced that being a servant of Amanullah he had taken up arms on his behalf but as Amanullah had left Afghanistan he saw no further necessity of continuing the struggle.

Perhaps some hint had been given to Ghulam Nabi to desist from further fighting Perhaps the Russian Minister in Kabul had come to some understanding with Muhammad Wali and Ata-ul-Haq, who were hand in glove with the Russians, and a message had been conveyed. Whatever the reason Ghulam Nabi ceased to concern himself with the war in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER X.

AMANULLAH'S ADVANCE ON GHAZNI, CAUSES OF HIS FAILURE AND THE REASONS FOR HIS DEPARTURE FROM AFGHANISTAN.

Two factors adversely affected the situation in Kandahar which, perhaps, explain the half hearted support given, at the outset, to Amanullah The first of these factors was the rapacity of Abdul Ali, brother of Abdul Karim, the Governor, whose energies were bent to the amassing of a fortune through bribes. The second factor was that no "fatwa" had been given by the mullahs. As soon, however, as Abdul Karim left Kandahar and the administration of civil affairs was taken over by Abdul Aziz, the War Minister, an entirely different policy was adopted. Abdul Aziz immediately commenced to placate the mullahs, held daily consultations with them, presented them with gifts and sanctioned annual salaries for them. Certain individuals disguised as "travellers from Kabul" were produced before the mullahs and before them swore on the Holy Quran that they had fled from Kabul owing to the atrocities committed by Bacha Saqao. They deposed to Bacha Saqao drinking wine. They swore that he forced his way into the public baths reserved for women: that he entertained himself by obtaining women and girls to dance before him. The mullahs, horrified, issued "fatwas" announcing that any man fighting against Bacha Saqao was a "Ghazi" and that any man killed so fighting would gain the death of a martyr. As soon as these "fatwas" were published the Kandaharis commenced to collect men. The first to start enlisting men under his banner was Saiyid Ashraf a "charsi" dervish from Kokaran, a man who had great influence amongst the other drug takers and dervishes. A typical dervish when under the influence of hemp was Saiyid Ashraf, clad in a red loin cloth, with unkempt hair, bareheaded, barefooted, carrying several iron rings in his hands. This Saiyid Ashraf with 300 of his disciples applied to be sent to do battle against the Bacha-i-Saqao. They were given Russian 5 line rifles. Next came Sadu Khan, Alakozai, a notorious robber, with 150 of the scum of the Kandahar gutters and offered his services. These were also promised arms. The impetus had been obtained. Tribal leaders followed suit and came forward with "bairaqs" with 1,400—1,500 men. Very soon 4,000 men had come forward. All were given arms. The first column under Abdul Ahad (Home Minister), numbering some 4,000 strong and including Saiyid Ashraf and Sadu Khan, marched towards Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

As other contingents collected, they were housed in tents in the Arq garden, were provided with arms and were paid two annas daily as ration money.

Muhammad Yakub (Wazir-i-Darbar) was charged with the raising of regular troops and he was instrumental in obtaining 500 such men.

From Kalat, Abdul Ahad telephoned to Amanullah to the effect that the Maliks and Khans of Mukur had written to say that they were repentant of their former actions; that they asked to be pardoned; that they were loyal to His Majesty; that they were prepared personally to interview Abdul Ahad in any place fixed as a rendezvous and that after the meeting they would come into Kalat. His Majesty agreed but advised caution lest they deceived Abdul Ahad.

Having obtained Amanullah's permission Abdul Ahad wrote in reply to the Khans and Maliks of Mukur to state that he was prepared to interview them in any place chosen by them and on any date. The Mukur Khans, then at the residence of Saiyid Ahmed Khan, Tokhi, in Shabar, sent back in reply "Our meeting should take place on the fourth day at the foot of the Suri Molki hill in Killa Khaliqdad". Abdul Ahad

agreed but at the same time sent his spies to ascertain whether any untoward movement was on foot. From his spies he ascertained that the Tarak and Ali Khel Khans of Mukur, consisting of the following:—

Aminullah (Nakhel),
Abdul Hakim (Sahu Khel).
Haji Ghulam Muhammad (Nauroz Khel),
Muhammad Khan, Shanki,
Yar Muhammad and Abdul Rahman (Garbaz Khel),
Malik Muhammad Hussain (Ali Khel),
Saiyid Ahmed Khan, Tokhi, and Colonel Niaz Muhammad,

who had deserted from Kalat-i-Ghilzai, had arrived in Killa Khaliqdad Khan with an armed force of 1,600 men and that their intention was to seize Abdul Ahad on his arrival with only a small following and to send him to Bacha Saqao. Even in the event of Abdul Ahad being killed the result on the Wardaks would be very great, and if he were taken alive would terminate, possibly, the Wardak rising against Bacha Saqao.

As soon as the trap had been prepared the Khans of Mukur wrote and invited Abdul Ahad to go to them. Abdul Ahad intimated that he was "coming as promised". Taking with him Khairu Jan, Popalzai, Hakim of Kalat, Baluch Khan, Hotak and some Tokhi Maliks, Abdul Ahad set out to keep the rendezvous. He, however, had given secret instructions to Saiyid Ashraf and Sadu Khan to follow immediately behind him with 2,000 men, 2 guns and 4 machine guns and also the 2nd Herati Kandak. As soon as the village of Khala and the hillock of Tabaqsar had been passed it was patent that the Mukur Khans had spread their forces in battle array in the vicinity of Killa Khaliqdad.

A temporary halt was made at Khala until the troops of Saiyid Ashref arrived. Then Abdul Ahad sent a message to the Khans of Mukur saying "You call yourselves Afghans and men. You invited me to a "Jirga" but your intention was murder. On your heads be it. If, in reality you are Afghans and men you must stand and fight." As soon as the message had issued Abdul Ahad gave orders to attack the Mukurites position. The fight ensued from 2 P.M. until sunset. The 2nd Herati Kandak substantially helped Abdul Ahad's force to gain the day and the Mukurites fled leaving 25 dead and 5 prisoners. One machine gun was also captured by Abdul Ahad. The losses of Abdul Ahad amounted to 3 killed. Khaliqdad Khan, Hotak, owner of the fort, also fled with the Mukurites and his fort and belongings were plundered. Abdul Ahad returned to Kalat and telephoned to Kandahar the news of his victory.

About this time Amanullah sent Abdul Karim, the Governor of Kandahar, to the Hazarajat in order to raise lashkars of Hazaras.

Amanullah continued to postpone his departure from Kandahar as he was desirous of having a force of at least 10,000 before venturing on the march to Kabul. Abdul Ahad daily implored Amanullah to be allowed to march on to Mukur with the first echelon, but His Majesty refused to do so. Amanullah's object was because he had conceived as being the best plan an advance made by two echelons, one day's march apart from each other, so that were the first echelon to meet with serious opposition the second echelon could intervene without undue delay.

At this juncture a despatch rider arrived from Herat carrying an urgent communication from Firqa Mishar Muhammad Ghaus Khan. It said "The civil population and the garrison of Herat are showing signs of disloyalty: subsequent to the arrival here of Ghulam Siddiq and the conveying on his orders from the Herat treasury to Meshed of six lakhs of rupees. The arrival of Mahmud Tarzi and Nur-us-Siraj by air has further agitated the people and added to their discontent. The popular belief is that His Majesty, himself will soon be seen in Herat *en route* to Europe. Your Majesty's order was then received that Firqa Mishar Muhammad Ghaus

was to be despatched with one Ghund as soon as possible. I began to make the necessary preparations for the journey although doubtful as to the loyalty of the troops. Firqa Mishar Abdur Rahman was also appointed as Firqa Mishar of Herat. A report was later received by me that some of the garrison had collected in the cathedral mosque and had enquired from the Mullahs whether it was lawful for co-religionists to fight with each other. The Mullahs stated that for a muslim to fight against a muslim was not a commendable act. In the meantime the information regarding the susceptibilities of the men had reached the ears of Abdur Rahman. He followed the men to the cathedral mosque and obtaining information as to the reply by the mullahs drew his revolver to shoot the mullahs. Some of the men present in the mosque killed Abdur Rahman. On hearing of this occurrence Muhammad Ibrahim, the Governor of Herat, hastened towards the mosque but was himself shot on the way together with his son-in-law Muhammad Siddiq, Muhammadzai. I then was informed and proceeding to the barracks, pacified the men. The danger of that Herat would be looted by the troops was averted and the troubles ceased. The civil and military affairs of Herat are now in my charge. The situation is still critical. A Governor should be sent". This news was kept secret from every body with the exception of His Majesty, the War Minister, the Wazir-i-Darbar, Hassan Jan and Mirza Ali Ahmed the Personal Secretary. The despatch rider from Herat was taken into the house of the War Minister and warned to hold his tongue.

A reply was then sent to Muhammad Ghaus as follows:—

"Shuja-ud-Daula Khan will shortly be arriving in Herat. He will take over charge of the civil administration. You, yourself, are to continue to attend to the military affairs and you are gradually to eliminate the Herati elements from the garrison replacing them by Durranis, Ghilzais, Gharaichs, Wardaks, Hazaras, etc., Kohistanis are not to be taken. Postpone your departure and keep the affairs of Herat well in control". The despatch rider was sent back the same night.

A conference was then called at which it was decided that, as it was practically impossible to prevent the Herat news from leaking out in Kandahar for more than ten days and as the news would have a deleterious effect on the spirit of the Kandaharis, Amanullah should commence his march on Ghazni in three days time. The attention of the public would be rivetted to this march and their hopes for His Majesty's success would tend to minimise the seriousness of the Herat news when it became public property. Amanullah, therefore, started on his march to Ghazni on the 25th March.

He first of all proceeded to the Mosque of the Khirqa Sharif and took out the "bairaq" of the Holy Mantle and passed through the bazar to the Manzil Bagh.

The following persons accompanied him:—Saiyid Daud Shah, Mullah Abdul Hamid (Custodian of the Khirqa Sharif Mosque) Sahibzada Muhammad Umar Jan (of Deh Khawajah), Muhammad Yusuf Khan (the Hazrat of Deh Khawaja), Mullah Abdush Shakur (Chief Qazi) Muhammad Akbar (Alakozai), Qazi Shah Bazurg (Nurzai) Akhunzada Fazal Haq, Ghulam Hassan (Barakzai,) Muhammad Usman Khan, Abdul Aziz (Popalzai), Faiz Muhammad (Muhammadzai), Abdullah Khan and Azizullah (Babi). All these individuals had the right and privilege to sit in the presence of His Majesty.

Others also accompanied him who belonged to the several tribes and communities in Kandahar. In all about 6,000 men under 160 "bairaqs" marched with 3 Kandaks of Kandahar infantry under Ghund Mishar Muhammad Yunas of Logar, 500 Kotwali troops under Muhammad Zafar Khan son of Akbar Khan, Mohmand, 500 "Shahi Risala" under Ghund Mishar Ahmed Ali Jan, brother of His Majesty. 500 Cavalry from the Farah Ghund under Ghund Mishar Abdur Rauf arrived just as His Majesty was mounting to proceed to Manzil Bagh. These were the only troops

which accompanied Amanullah although the War Minister had been directed to issue orders to Abdul Ali, Hakim of Spin Boldak, to follow with the garrison of that place.

Amanullah left at 3 P.M. and arrived in Manzil Bagh at 4-30 P.M. The citizens of Kandahar, in large numbers, accompanied him to Manzil Bagh. At the instance of His Majesty the troops and civilians massed themselves together and Qazi Mullah Abdul Ghaffar, a pure minded and religious person, rising to his feet addressed them and said "You who are about to proceed on this expedition are all "Ghazis" and those of you who are killed will be martyrs. Our own prayer is that this killing of muslims should cease and that His Majesty should emerge successful". After him Sahibzada Muhammad Umar Jan singled out by the crowd spoke as follows :—

"We humble folk too are keeping your company and pray for the good of Islam". Then Amanullah made an impassioned speech regarding the misfortunes which had befallen the country and moved his listeners to tears. After Amanullah had finished speaking the troops were dismissed to their tents.

A three days halt was made in Manzil Bagh in the hope that more men would join but with the exception of a few Barakzais no more men arrived. Camp arrangements at Manzil Bagh included the provision of a large tent which served as a mosque. Amanullah and his entire entourage attended congregrational prayers five times a day. Provision was also, made for those Khans and leaders already mentioned and for officers of and above the rank of Ghund Mishar, Inayatullah Khan, the Wazir-i-Darbar, Adib Effendi, Tarzi's sons, Hassan Jan and the Secretary to take their meals with His Majesty. Despite Amanullah's orders that munitions and money were to be taken in larger quantities than was considered necessary, the Wazir-i-Darbar, Muhammad Yakub Jan, either through treachery or on account of his short sighted policy failed to take enough munitions and took only two lakhs in silver and one lakh in paper.

On the 30th March 1929, the army marched from Manzil Bagh towards Robat Mohmand. The order of march was as follows :— In motor cars to proceed ahead, grey beards and leaders. Advanced guard 200 Shahi Risala. Behind them the baggage train and artillery. Then His Majesty's cavalcade headed by Inayatullah Khan : the crowd of followers and Khans of Kandahar. 300 Shahi Risala and 300 Cavalry from Farah. Right flank 100 Cavalry. Left flank 100 Farah Cavalry. Then the "Bairaq" leaders and the infantry Kandaks marching in formation.

Mohmand Robat was reached in five hours. The water being brackish the troops suffered considerably. The officials of Kandahar and Abdul Aziz, the War Minister at the time of evening prayer consulted for about two hours with Amanullah then kissed his hands and took their leave of him.

On the next day His Majesty accompanied by Kandak Mishar Abdur Rahman, Azizullah, Babi, Akhundzada Fazl Haq, Haji Wali Muhammad Khan (Steward) left Robat Mohmand in motor cars for Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Inayatullah was instructed to maintain on each day the same order of march as had been initiated on the first day. Amanullah's reason for proceeding to Kalat was to expedite the departure of Abdul Ahad and his force towards Mukur. His intentions were to rejoin the main force at Tirandaz after halting for two nights in Kalat.

Inayatullah now commanding the force, arrived in Shahr Safa and the next day at Tirandaz. This place is a pleasant spot with green fields and meadows and running water and whilst all were engaged in putting up tents and in eating or drinking tea at 12 NOON, His Majesty's cars were seen coming from the direction of Kalat. His Majesty arrived. The band played the National Anthem. Amanullah appeared to be in a very good mood. Very graciously he enquired from all present how they had fared. After partaking of some food he rested for a little while, then, having performed his evening prayer walked across to the river, which was near by,

escorted by a few men of the Shahi Risala and Faiz Muhammad Khan, Muhammadzai shot a few duck, some foxes and jackals and returned at dusk to camp.

Amanullah straightway, entered a large tent in which councils were always held, and after other people had congregated there, Amanullah announced that he would inform them of what he had done in Kalat-i-Ghilzai. "In the first place" he said "although Abdul Ahad and his force were eager to be allowed to advance I have restrained them and have intimated that as soon as we arrive in Kalat they should advance to Robat Sar-i-Asp. As regards Ghund Mishar Muhammad Akram and his treachery I have made personal enquiries and have come to the conclusion that Muhammad Akram was, of a truth, at the bottom of all the troubles and I consider that he was killed justly for he was guilty, I then sent for Mirza Nazar Muhammad who was also implicated in the trouble. He was in Jail where he had been placed by the Home Minister. I asked him as to the punishment he thought he deserved and he answered "death". I told him I had pardoned him and he was set free. Again there were rebels belonging to Mukur connected with the Hotak Mirza's trouble. They were in custody in Kalat. Our troops were clamouring for them and I handed them over to them and every one was shot down with the exception of a mullah who had stigmatised me as a "Kafir". I called him to me and asked him for his reason for so doing. He replied "because of the public opinion". I then ordered him to be shot. After he had been taken out of the tent and had gone a few yards I called him back and said to him "Have you had a taste of death?" He replied "Yes". "So I pardoned him and released him and sent him to the people of Mukur with a "farman". Then, whilst I was in Kalat, written statements were received from the Hazarajat-Jaghuri-Malistan Karabagh-Jaghtu stating that their lashkars were gathered and that they were encamped near Ghazni. They were all armed but lacked a leader and desired one to be appointed.

In the absence of Abdul Karim in Uruzghan, Besud and Dehzangi I decided to send my brother, Muhammad Amir and Khawaja Hidayatullah Khan in order to enable the Hazaras to enter Mukur and Ghazni before we did. These are the things I have done whilst in Kalat. The news from Kabul, Wardak and Ghazni is satisfactory. The Wardaks have gained successes. We are expected back soon".

All present offered their thanks to His Majesty and prayed for his success. Dinner was then served after partaking of which we all withdrew to our tents.

On the following day the march was resumed from Tirandaz. Robat Jaldak was the next stage. His Majesty ordered the tent transport to go ahead. At 1 P.M. the column arrived in Jaldak. As soon as we arrived it started to rain heavily and everyone took shelter in their tents.

At noon, Riza Khan, Andar, brought a letter from Gul Ahmed Khan from Ghazni. It contained news of an encouraging nature in that it stated that the Wardaks had held up the Saqavis North of Ghazni and advised the march to be continued to Ghazni as expeditiously as possible. As a set off against this was a letter from Abdul Hakim, the Hakim-i-Ala of the Southern Province and Firqa Mishar Muhammad Siddiq which was to the address of the War Minister who was a brother of Abdul Hakim. This letter indicated that both the signatories of the letter inclined towards Bacha Saqao and conveyed an invitation to Abdul Aziz to do likewise. Amanullah personally retained this letter.

Riza Khan was sent back to Gul Ahmed Khan with a "farman" to the effect that Amanullah and his forces would soon be with him. Another "farman" was sent to Ghund Mishar Muhammad Khan, Andar, who was in Gardez, appointing him Firqa Mishar and instructing him to send Muhammad Siddiq to Ghazni to His Majesty.

To expedite Riza Khan's return a car was placed at his disposal as far as Mukur. From Mukur he was to proceed in the disguise in which he had

come. Riza Khan, after passing Mukur was shot dead by one Abdullah, Andar at the instigation of one Jamurad, Andar, at the village of Khunian. The "farmans" were taken off his body and were sent through Muhammad Alam son of Sher Muhammad (Naib Salar, Andar) to the Saqavi Governor of Ghazni, Muhammad Karim of Killa Murad Beg.

At Jaldak a Ghilzai traveller was caught by the "charsis" from Kandahar and brought to Amanullah with the false report that he had been spreading propaganda against fighting Bacha Saqao and their co-religionists. Amanullah immediately ordered him to be shot.

After halting that night in Jaldak the column marched towards Kalat-i-Ghilzai. The first echelon under Abdul Ahad moved out of Kalat towards Sar-i-Asp as Amanullah with the second echelon entered that place.

The Hakim and the Tokhi and Hotak citizens came out to receive His Majesty and a large quantity of cooked food was provided for the troops.

Amanullah took up his quarters in the Kalat garden and the troops went into tents in the vicinity.

It was believed that Amanullah would make a halt for at least three days in Kalat before going on but contrary to expectation he ordered the march to be continued the next day as he considered delay to be inadvisable.

Whilst in Kalat-i-Ghilzai Amanullah decided to replace the obsolete pattern rifles issued to the "bairaqdars" in Kandahar with Russian 5 line rifles which were in the Kalat arsenal and to store the old weapons for the use of "bairaqdars" arriving from Kandahar. Muhammad Yakub was ordered to effect the rearming of the "bairaqdars" but as he did not show sufficient energy in doing so the work was entrusted to Munshi Ali Ahmed Khan who worked all that night as the column was marching the next morning.

His Majesty did not accompany the troops when they marched out the next morning but followed later by car. Before leaving, he interviewed the Hakim of Kalat, Khair Muhammad Khan, who reported that he was doubtful concerning the loyalty of the Tokhis and Hotaks and suggested that it would be advisable to take along with His Majesty some of their leading men which would have a deterrent effect on these tribes. Khair Muhammad also stated that the Hotaks and Tokhis were desirous of purchasing exemption from providing men at Rs. 400 (Kabuli) per man and that Khaliqdad, Hotak, had deserted with a following of Hotak malcontents. Khair Muhammad advocated the confiscation of his forts and estates unless he returned within three days.

His Majesty approved of the suggestions made by Khair Muhammad and "farmans" were prepared accordingly.

The following Hotak and Tokhi leaders were ordered to proceed with Amanullah :—

Baluch Khan, Hotak, with his son Muhammad Alam;

Mirza Nazar Muhammad, Hotak;

Abdul Munim, Tokhi, with his son Muhammad Qasim;

Sahib Khan, Tokhi (brother of Abdul Munim);

Muhammad Fazal Tokhi;

Ismatullah Tokhi; and Sahib Jan, Tokhi.

A "farman" for the collection of purchase money was also issued and one regarding Khaliqdad's estates was despatched.

Amanullah then proceeded to Sar-i-Asp by car. In the evening he telephoned to Abdul Ahad who was then at Shabar. Sanction was given to Abdul Ahad's column marching the next day to Aghujan. However, when Amanullah intimated this fact to the leading men present with him they suggested that it would have been wiser to have ordered a halt to be made

at Shabar until Amanullah's column arrived at Tazi, the next stage which would mean that only one day's march would separate the two columns. This would prevent any attempt on the part of the Taraks to come between the two columns. This plan was agreed to and His Majesty ordered Mirza Ali Ahmed, Munshi, to telephone to Abdul Ahad cancelling the previous sanction and to order a day's halt being made at Shabar. The telephone was not working so a "farman" was written and it was given to the Munshi to take by car to Abdul Ahad. At 11 P.M. the Munshi left but as the driver was not familiar with the road he took a wrong turning and followed (the road) to Shahjui and it was not till the next morning that Abdul Ahad's camp was reached. The troops were on the point of marching and Abdul Ahad was displeased at the cancellation of his order but had to obey.

As it turned out, however, the delay was advantageous for during that day Tarak Muliks came into Abdul Ahad's camp and offered their help. The following men came in:—

Abdur Rahman Khan, Adamkhel;
Sultan Ali Khan, Manikhel;
Muhammad Khan, Shangi; and
Fateh Muhammad Khan, Nauroz Khel;

Abdul Ahad accepted their aid and paid them Rs. 10,000 (Afghani) through Khair Gul Khan for supplies to be provided at Robat Aghujan on the following night.

Ali Ahmed Khan reported to Amanullah at Tazi that his orders had been conveyed to Abdul Ahad. Amanullah then telephoned to Abdul Ahad and received the information regarding the Taraks and the arrangements made with them for the provision of supplies.

On the next day the force moved out of Tazi and Shabar was reached by 12 NOON. Abdul Ahad also left Shabar that day but no news regarding his march had been received by 3 P.M. As some anxiety was felt regarding the Taraks whose loyalty was not above suspicion and as it had been reported that considerable firing had been heard His Majesty ordered Qamar-ud-din to get into a car and to proceed to Abdul Ahad's camp to ascertain whether all was well with him.

The whole camp was eagerly awaiting news and Amanullah himself was using field glasses when, suddenly, two cars were seen approaching from the North at a tremendous speed.

Abdul Ahad and Sadu Khan were in one car and Qamar-ud-din, who had been sent by His Majesty for news, was in the other. There was intense excitement regarding the fate of the troops. Had Mukur been captured or not? Sadu Khan drew his sword and began dancing and yelled out in Pushtu. "We have captured Mukur and the enemy has been routed". There was great jubilation in the camp on learning this news.

Abdul Ahad went straight to His Majesty and reported that during the march from Shabar to Aghujan this morning the Tarak Khans, who had come in the day and had tendered their allegiance, arrived and joined his force in the neighbourhood of Pashokand together with their followers and a joint advance was made towards Robat-i-Aghujan.

Information was given by some of the Khans, who were more sincere than the rest, that they had heard that Aminullah Khan and Abdul Hakim Khan, Tarak, and Saiyid Ahmed Khan, Tokhi, (who had not yet submitted) had collected a lashkar of about 700 men and were prepared to oppose the march. On obtaining this information a warning was passed to the leading troops but no change was made in the attitude adopted towards the Khans themselves. At a point about four miles beyond Pashokand, where there was a village with two hillocks overlooking it, a body of men was observed. Fire was opened on the column by these men. Orders were issued to open

fire on them with two mountain guns. A few bursts of shrapnel had an immediate effect and the enemy were soon in flight. Orders were then issued to the cavalry to pursue them. The "Karraquars", without orders followed them as well. There were no casualties amongst the Kandahar forces. Casualties, if any, amongst the enemy had been removed. The Kandahari force then encamped at Aghujan. Adequate arrangements for rationing the troops had been made by the friendly Khans. Abdul Ahad expressed desire to return immediately to his force. Amanullah was delighted when he received this information but enjoined caution on Abdul Ahad in the following words. "As it is your desire to return, so be it and God be with you, but remember, do not rely on the Khans, who profess, at this moment their loyalty, nor consider that the enemy is incapable of striking another blow. They may, even to-night, make a surprise attack. If not to-night then at the first opportune moment". Abdul Ahad replied that he had taken the precaution to place guns and machine guns on the heights overlooking the "Robat" and had warned the troops to be watchful and alert. "The rest" he said "lies in the hand of God". His Majesty advised Abdul Ahad on the necessity of keeping the telephone line between Mukur and Aghujan in working order. Abdul Ahad then left for his encampment.

That evening Akhundzada Ghulam Mahmud a venerable old man with great influence over the Ghilzai and a resident of Robat Shahjui presented himself and his sons before Amanullah. Although Amanullah was well aware that the man was markedly hostile to him still he treated him with every mark of respect and asked him to accompany him to Ghazni. Ghulam Mahmud begged to be excused on account of his old age and consequent frailty. Amanullah then said that, under the circumstances, the Akhundzada's son, Ghulam Habib, should accompany him and to this Ghulam Mahmud was reluctantly forced to agree.

After the departure of Ghulam Mahmud and his sons the whole of the Shahjui Wazir colony came to His Majesty and kissed his hands and intimated that two hundred of their fighting men had proceeded with the 1st column under Abdul Ahad and, if ordered, the whole colony would also go. Amanullah spoke to the Wazirs very sympathatically and gave them permission to return to their homes.

Azizullah Khan, Babi, was made the Chief Khan of the Ghilzai tribes present in the camp, which were Tokhi and Hotaks, in order to represent His Majesty and to lessen the minor worries of the King whilst traversing the Ghilzai country as far as Ghazni.

That night was passed in Robat Shabar. All supply arrangements were adequate and had been made by Fakir Muhammad Khan, brother of Khan Gul Khan, Tokhi, who had accompanied Abdul Ahad.

At 9 o'clock on the following day, Amanullah marched out of Robat Shabar. On nearing Pashokand, whilst still in the Tokhi country, a few desultory shots were fired from some small forts from a distance of about half a mile south of the road. His Majesty and the whole force halted. Munim Khan, Tokhi, and a few sowars of the "Shahi Risala" were ordered to ascertain who was firing. They returned bringing with them two or three lads of about 15—16 years of age who, between them, had one muzzle loading rifle. The real persons were, however, not discovered but these boys were kept in custody. The march was resumed to Aghujan. At 11-30 A.M when about two miles distance from Aghujan, Muhammad Yaqub, who was marching at the head of the column, came galloping up to His Majesty, with field glasses in his hands; and reported that a large body of men had been observed on the hills to their front and near the road and opposite the Robat and that more men were climbing the hills. He considered them to be the enemy. Amanullah observed them for a little time through glasses and said "Quite right. They are". Some of those present said "Your Majesty. Those are our own men on the hillock. The head of the column

must have arrived early in camp. "Amanullah, however, disagreed because, the men observed were all in tribal dress. The whole force came to a halt. A cavalry troop from Farah was sent to reconnoitre. Eventually it was discovered that the enemy were "bairaqdars" from Kandahar who had climbed the hills to obtain a view of the surrounding country. The force then resumed its march arriving in camp at Robat Aghujan at 1 P M

After Amanullah had had some food the Tarak Khans informed him that fearing ill treatment at the hands of his troops all the inhabitants of Aghujan had fled to the hills in the neighbourhood. Amanullah sent some of the Khans, Muhammad Yakub and Azizullah Khan, Babi, to reassure the villagers and to induce them to return. In the evening a few of the local elders came to His Majesty and presented a few eggs, curd and hot cakes. Amanullah received them graciously and having rewarded them allowed them to take their leave.

As no news of Abdul Ahad had been received as to how he had fared on his march to Mukur and as Abdul Ahad had made a request for money, Amanullah ordered Ali Ahmed Khan to take with him Rs. 20,000 (Afghani) from the field treasury, in bags, and to return after a halt of not more than 20 minutes. Ali Ahmed did as he was ordered. The distance between Aghujan and Mukur is 12 miles and the journey was accomplished in 30 minutes. Abdul Ahad was sitting in the Mukur Hotel. Seeing the Royal car it was presumed that His Majesty himself was arriving and a ceremonial reception had, therefore, been arranged by the troops. Realizing what had occurred Ali Ahmed Khan stopped the car and sent a message to Abdul Ahad that His Majesty was not present. The money was handed over personally to Abdul Ahad and Ali Ahmed went straight to the hotel. Abdur Rashid and Muhammad Sarwar (Feroze Khel, Tarak) Muhammad Rafiq Khan and other Ali Khel and Tarak Maliks were with Abdul Ahad who was in high spirits. Under the pretext that he wished to perform his ablutions, Abdul Ahad separated himself from the company and enquired from Ali Ahmed as to the real reason for his coming to Mukur. Having informed him as to the reason Ali Ahmed enquired for information regarding the situation. He was told that the day before the entry into Mukur 1,000 Jaghuri Hazaras had obtained possession of Mukur. These Hazaras had been despatched by Muhammad Amin Jan. The garrison consisting of 1 Colonel, 1 Captain and 160 men, all Squavis, had surrendered. Abdul Ahad also indicated that telephonic communication would be established between Mukur and Aghujan by 9 P.M.

Ali Ahmed returned and His Majesty was delighted with the trend of affairs especially regarding the advent of the Hazaras. Amanullah enquired if Ali Ahmed had seen, personally, the Hazaras and his reply was to the effect that he had and that the Hazaras, on seeing the royal car, had become so enthusiastic that most of them had come and had kissed it. Amanullah was visibly affected by this and spoke in terms of high praise of the Hazaras. Just before retiring for the night telephonic communication to Mukur was established and His Majesty spoke a few gracious words with Abdul Ahad and gave him messages of congratulation to be conveyed to the Hazara leaders.

On the following day Amanullah marched to Mukur. Abdul Ahad had made arrangements for a ceremonial parade to mark the occasion. Both sides of the road were lined by the Herati and Kandahari troops and also by the "bairaqdars". The Hazaras and the Kohistanis of Bacha Saqao, who had surrendered in Mukur, armed and equipped, had been formed up to salute the King. The local Khans and citizens were in a group by themselves. On the arrival of His Majesty salutes were fired. Amanullah then entered the hotel and went to his own apartment.

After the mid-day prayer, Amanullah entered a large darbar tent. He sent, first of all, for the Hazaras and asked them if all was well with them. These Hazaras were to all intents and purposes regular troops. Their

leader was one Ishaq Doli. * Apparently he had served for some years in the Indian army in Quetta. This Ishaq received from His Majesty a "farman" appointing him a Colonel. Among the thousand Hazaras who had arrived in Mukur there were ten who were able to use a machine gun and these were distributed amongst the several Kandaks as machine gunners. Some 300 of the Hazaras had been trained as soldiers in Quetta and had subsequently returned to their homes. The remainders were ordinary peasants. All of them had their own arms. His Majesty inspected them, gave each man two rupees and then dismissed them to their tents.

On being asked his reason for not disarming Bacha Saqa's men after their surrender Abdul Ahad replied that he was waiting for orders. His Majesty said "You have made a mistake". Orders were then given for their disarming and arrest. When the Kohistanis were brought before Amanullah he told them that he had decided to have their Colonel, Ghulam Mohiyuddin, shot as he was a dangerous person. The Captain, Ghulam Jan, was imprisoned pending an enquiry. The three or four men who were from Kandahar were handed over to their own communities and "bairaqdars". Sixty-seven were from Tagao. These were given Rs. 30 (Afghani) each, were furnished with "farmans" to their respective Khans in Tagao and allowed to go. The remainder, who were, Tajiks from Ghazni, were ordered to be kept in custody. They were informed by Amanullah that, as they were the first to take the oath of allegiance to Bacha Saqao, he would keep them as hostages for the good behaviour of their fellow Tajiks in Ghazni. If their fellow tribesmen repented of their past actions and surrendered themselves to him he would pardon, the prisoners. If not then he would put them to death.

Abdul Ahad asked for permission to move out from Mukur the next day. His Majesty argued but at the same time intimated that he desired to speak with the Khans of Mukur in order to persuade them to choose from amongst themselves a Khan to be Hakim of Mukur. Abdul Ahad discussed the question with the Khans. Realizing fully that to be Hakim of Mukur under the conditions then prevailing was tantamount to signing ones own death warrant they elected Abdul Qadir Khan (Ali Khel) who was a man of no importance and had no influence.

As the 1st column was lamentably weak in cavalry 500 men from Farah were transferred from the 2nd Echelon. Abdul Ahad marched out of Mukur on the next day and marched to Gawain.

Although the telephone between Mukur and Ghazni was in working order, no connection could be obtained with Ghazni as that place was definitely hostile.

During the second day of His Majesty's halt in Mukur, a council of war was held, at which the question of prolonging the halt in Mukur mooted by Amanullah was discussed. It was decided, however, that further delay was dangerous and that they should push on, Azizullah, Muhammadzai, of Tiri, Kandahar, was ordered to remain in Mukur with his 400 "bairaqdars".

At this juncture Mullah Abdul Hai, who had held the appointment of Judge of the Appellate Court in Amanullah's regime, arrived in Mukur from Kabul having fled from Bacha Saqao. He went first of all to Muhammad Yakub, the Wazir-i-Darbar. Muhammad Yakub apprehensive that Abdul Hai was cognizant of his own treachery and knew that he had been secretly corresponding with Mahmud Sami and Bacha Saqao himself, did not present Abdul Hai to His Majesty but advised him to flee for his life as Amanullah would without doubt have him killed. Abdul Hai, frightened, fled from Mukur. Amanullah was informed of the facts and instituted a search for Abdul Hai but he could not be traced. Amanullah, however, now distrusted Muhammad Yakub but bided his time to take revenge.

After halting three days in Mukur, Amanullah marched to Obah. After a one day's halt he marched to Gawain, which is also called Jamrud ,Amanullah now entered the Andar Ghilzais territory. The fort of Muhammad

* *Vide* page 61.

Alam Khan, son of Sher Muhammad Khan, Andar, Naib Salar - a pro-Bacha Saqao Khan—is situated in the vicinity of Gawain. Muhammad Alam Khan with his son Faqir Muhammad, with Niaz Muhammad Khan, son of Muhammad Alam's uncle and Haji Abdur Rahman, all of whom are leading men of the Marjan Khel came in to pay homage to Amanullah. His Majesty ordered them to be arrested. They were confined in the lines of the "Shahi Risala". Sher Muhammad, Kharoti, on his arrival was, on the other hand, treated very graciously by Amanullah. A Hazara lashkar about 1,000 strong then came into camp. They belonged to the Qarabagh section of Muhammad Khawajah's following, were all armed and equipped and were led by influential men, Ahmed Ali Khan, son of Muhammad Allah Khan, Malik Muhammad Hussain Khan, Faiz Muhammad Khan, Tokhi and Malik Hasan Riza, Shaki. The Hazara leaders came forward and kissed Amanullah's hands. Permission was given to tents being pitched for the Hazara leaders near the royal shamiana.

Whilst Amanullah was out walking that evening he noticed a house was burning and later he ascertained that it had been intentionally set fire to by Kandahari "bairaqdars". Amanullah immediately had it promulgated throughout his forces that no recurrence of such an incident would be tolerated. The owner of the house was summoned and when it had been ascertained that the loss which had been incurred amounted to Rs. 200 (Afghani), Amanullah compensated him by giving him Rs. 500 (Afghani). The leaders of the "bairaqs" were then sent for and Amanullah cautioned them to take steps to prevent them from again committing any such acts, saying "We have come to overcome rebels not to turn friends into rebels".

On the following morning Amanullah left Gawain and halted at Robat Mashaki. Sher Jan Kharote, who had previously obtained Amanullah's permission, had pitched a large shamiana in a green spot close to the road about midway between Gawain and Mashaki. Breakfast was provided by him, consisting of cold meat and bread with tea, for some 500 people. Kharoti tribesmen were in attendance and entertained the force by playing on their drums during the meal.

Mashaki was reached at about 2 P.M. Amanullah immediately attempted to telephone to Ghazni but with no success. No news had been received as to the progress made by Abdul Ahad apart from the fact that he had marched from Nani that morning towards Ghazni.

Nand Mull and Hoda Kishen, two Hindu traders of Kandahar then arrived in camp and laid a complaint before His Majesty that their two cars had been pillaged by some Andar robbers at a place some two miles distant from Amanullah's camp. Some Andar Khans who were present stated that the robbers belonged to the following of one Bacha Baz and that this gang was pro-Bacha Saqao. It was also learnt from these Khans that Ghazni had been surrounded by the forces of Abdul Ahad and that fighting was going on.

Amanullah was startled by this news for now for the first time he realized the possibility of opposition on the road to Kabul. He had considered that hostilities would not commence until Kabul itself was reached but now the fact was apparent that the Ghazni tribesmen were hostile to him and that he would have to fight at Ghazni. Amanullah then ordered 1,000 pamphlets to be printed in the camp press. These were addressed to the "citizens Ghazni" threatening them with massacre and wholesale looting if they failed to surrender the city by two o'clock the next day and they were advised to surrender the Bacha Saqao Governor of Ghazni. Intimation was made, however, that the Hindu community would be spared. These leaflets were signed by Amanullah the next morning and were handed over to Ali Ahmed Khan Mohmand to be taken to Ghazni, as he was a resident of that place. Abdul Aziz, Editor of the "Tulu-i-Afghan" accompanied him in a car provided by the Wazir-i-Darbar. When they reached the environs of Ghazni fighting was in progress and a heavy bombardment of


Abdul Ahads
Hd. Qrs.
Kala-i-Kazi
Khuja Ahmad
Khuja Miri
Balut
Tarak
Hazrat
GHAZNI
Rauza
Kalai-Nau
Ghazni R.
Mushak
Deh Khudādad
Pir Zādah
About
3 miles
Lajaka Tasang
Kuh bād
Pir Shabāz
Shāliz
Ispandi Khushk
Avezu
Ghazni R.
SKETCH MAP
of
GHAZNI
and
SURROUNDING COUNTRY
Scale of Yards.
1000
0
1000
2000

Ghazni was then being carried out. It was quite impossible to deliver the "farmans" or leaflets and no alternative was left but to return. Ali Ahmed Khan and his companion arrived in Nani at about 2 P.M. Amanullah had also arrived from Mashaki. On learning the news Amanullah became very dejected and intimated that he did not wish the news to become known. But it was impossible to hide the facts that fighting was in progress as the roar of the guns could be distinctly heard.

In Nani the following leaders of Andars came to offer their services to Amanullah :—

Mullah Muhammad Ismail (grandson of Mulla Mushk Alam, the Akhundzada);
Muhammad Riza Khan;
Khudadad Khan (Jalalzai);
Abdul Aziz Khan (Lakankhel);
Sherdad Khan (Baiyizid Khel);
Malik Zamir; and
Saiyid Muhammad Khan (Musa Khel).

A horse had been brought by each of these Khans as a gift for Amanullah. His Majesty was very cold in his attitude towards these men and upbraided them for permitting their tribesmen to fight against him. The Khans replied to the effect that ignorant people existed amongst every community and that their hold over their people depended on their tribesmen's fear of the government; that they themselves had lost all prestige. The blame for the outbreak in Ghazni against Amanullah was put by them on either the Mullah Sahib or Sadu Khel or Bacha Baz, the robber, who had brought discredit on the whole tribe. "We were looking forward to the arrival of Your Majesty" they said "Thank God, however, that you are safe".

After the evening prayers and when the Khans had departed, Amanullah came into the reception tent. News were brought then that the Andars were preparing to attack the camp that very night. Amanullah gave orders for the defence of the camp. One face was entrusted to the regulars, two to the "bairaqdars" and the fourth to the Hazaras Throughout that night there was an uproar in the camp. The report of the impending attack, however, proved false.

Early the next morning, Mirza Fateh Muhammad Khan (Tajik), who was pro-Amanullah, Muhammad Karim Khan, Muhammadzai, and Gul Ahmed Khan's younger brother, came from Abdul Ahad with the suggestion that after leaving Nani, His Majesty should halt at Hauz-i-Sultan and Kuhbad. The latter place was suggested as being suitable, for the prevention of Andars coming from and going to Ghazni and also because supplies could be obtained from the villages in its vicinity, Arezu, Shaliz, Lajak, Nauabad and Tasan. It was also pointed out that it was well situated as a "launching point" for an attack on Ghazni. Amanullah agreed with the suggestion and ordered the column to move out of Nani and to proceed to Kuhbad.

The advice given was, however, bad advice. The ground was not fit for camping, the supplies would not be forthcoming. All this was known to Ali Ahmed whose own village was in the near vicinity of Kuhbad and he also realised that it was through personal enmity to himself that reports of its suitability had been furnished by Abdul Ahad in the hope that the Kandahar troops would ruin the place. However the column had moved and Ali Ahmed decided to keep silent on the matter.

As no road existed between Nani and Kuhbad and there were numerous water channels to negotiate, the force had to overcome great difficulties. Guns were man handled from bank to bank at the crossing of the Pir Shahbaz river, motor cars, in particular found the obstacles difficulty to negotiate and

the Pir Shahbaz crossing impossible. Motor cars were, therefore, despatched across country to Killa Amir Muhammad Khan, which is about two miles South-West of Ghazni about 100 "bairaqdars" acted as escort to the cars. However, eventually, the column halted near Kuhbad. The villages from which supplies were expected were all hostile and were occupied by Andars and Suleman Khels. No running stream existed in Kuhbad and water was obtainable only from the Karez. Other than supplies provided by Ali Ahmed, which were insufficient for the column, no supplies were forthcoming. Amanullah ordered the unripe corn standing in the fields to be cut and to be given to the animals and also ordered animals to be let loose in the fields. This did not help the situation as regards the inhabitants.

During that night three hundred Saqavis with two guns took up their position near Killa Pir Zadah, about two miles from Kuhbad. At dawn these guns commenced shelling Amanullah's camp and gave considerable trouble.

Amanullah after observing the position of these two guns ordered an assault to be made from three sides. Ghund Mishar Muhammad Zafar, with 500 Kotwalis and one gun to attack from one side. Ghund Mishar 'Abdul Qaiyum, son of Abdul Karim, the Governor of Kandahar, with a Barakzai lashkar and one gun to attack from another side and Ghund Mishar Pir Muhammad (Tarakhel) with one Kandahari Kandak and one gun from the third side.

Before reaching his objective Muhammad Zafar was engaged by Andars in the gardens near Deh Khodaidad and his advance was held up.

Pir Muhammad moved with great caution and in military formation but before he reached the enemy's position, Abdul Qaiyum had surrounded it. Bacha Saqao's men had, however, extricated themselves and had withdrawn. The forts were taken possession of by Abdul Qaiyum and guns were mounted on the position. By this time it was midday. The Andar and Suleman Khel lashkars then attacked the column itself. Their strength was approximately between 7,000 and 8,000. The "bairaqdars" were ordered to advance against them with the regulars held in reserve. Large calibre guns were hauled up to hillocks on to the flanks. The fight, was, at first, a rifle duel but as soon as the guns started to shell the enemy their lashkars immediately retired. Some of the enemy who were behind shelter in forts also broke and fled.

After the engagement Amanullah gave Rs. 20,000 to Abdush Shaqur and ordered him personally to visit the villages and to obtain supplies on payment and to see that no one was molested by the troops. Two hundred transport animals were provided to bring in the supplies. Abdush Shaqur obtained a certain amount of supplies from the villages in the immediate vicinity of the camp but as he penetrated further into the country he was attacked by Andars who seized fifty of his transport animals and killed two of the "Shahi Risala" escort. Abdul Qazi returned disappointed and crest fallen.

To add to the difficulties of the situation it was reported that a night attack was being arranged against the camp from the direction of Zankhan with no supplies, no water and in danger of being attacked, Amanullah's forces were in a sorry plight.

The 1st column had been engaged for three days with the inhabitants of Ghazni and the forces of Bacha Saqao. Abdul Ahad,, at one period of the fighting, had taken possession of the Caravan Serais and shops round Ghazni but Bacha Saqao's men had forced him to abandon them and had been pushed back.

The Italian guns firing from the upper citadel of Ghazni proved particularly troublesome to Abdul Ahad's men and inflicted considerable casualties. So much so that, in order to get beyond the range of these guns, 'Abdul Ahad retired about a mile.

Amanullah's column was also in difficulties. All roads were blocked and communication between the two columns was impossible. His Majesty, in consultation with Inayatullah, and Muhammad Yakub, decided to retire to Nani, halt there for one day and then join Abdul Ahad. It was hoped by this means to reinforce Abdul Ahad and the force would have the additional advantage of being near Hazara villages and therefore supplies.

Orders were issued to the troops to have an early evening meal and to break camp with as little noise as possible. A large number of transport animals had fallen into the hands of the rebels and most of the men left without pack transport. Noise and uproar filled the camp and eventually the force moved off in great disorder. The only guide who had been secured disappeared. Men for whom transport animals were not available were forced to load up their own riding ponies. For about one and a half hours there was moonlight. Then it became dark and direction was lost. Amanullah called on Ali Ahmed to act as guide seeing that it was his own country. Ali Ahmed agreed to do his best but pointed out that he had not visited his own village for twenty three years. Ali Ahmed managed to guide the column to Ispandi Khushk in which place Mirza Fateh Muhammad Khan, Tajik lived. He was pro-Amanullah. Mirza Fateh Muhammad informed Amanullah that, in his opinion, it was inadvisable for His Majesty to remain in Nani as, were he to do so, the enemy would consider that they had inflicted a defeat on him and in consequence their morale would be considerably raised. He advised, therefore, that it would be better were Amanullah to join Abdul Ahad without delay despite the inevitable and unavoidable inconvenience and Fateh Muhammad promised to act as guide. Amanullah agreed and Mirza Fateh Muhammad led the column *via* Zilzilah and Mushak, through the hillocks and mounds finally arriving at Abdul Ahad's camp after 16 hours marching. The troops showed signs of distress having had no sleep or food.

The locality in which the force now found itself was near Hazara villages and liberal supplies were obtained.

The day after the joining up of the two columns, Hazara lashkars commenced to arrive. Two thousand under Gul Muhammad Khan, son of Arbab Bakht Yar Khan were from Besud. One thousand under Ahmed Ali, son of Muhammad Allah were from the Muhammad Khawajah and Chardastah sections of the Qarabagh Hazaras. Eight hundred of the Sukhteh and Uludani sections under Malik Shah Pasand and Malik Khan Shirin Khan. About two thousand were under Niaz Muhammad Khan, Mehtar Yusaf and Baz Muhammad Khan Khush Abdal, these were from the villages Nahur, Sorab, Tarkan and Kakrak. Five hundred from Bayat, Qiyaq, Darreh Siasang and Ahmeda came under Muhammad Nasir Khan, Muhammad Sardar Khan and Ahmed Ali Khan, Bayat.

All the Hazaras brought their own arms and were accommodated in the forts which were in the vicinity of the camp. 20 pice per day was allowed to each man as ration money. The next day 2,000 Hazaras of Jaghuri and Malistan arrived under Haji Muhammad Hassan Khan and Barat Ali and Abdullah Khan, sons of Sher Ali Khan, Jaghuri.

The arrival of this large Hazara contingent put new life into the Kandahari forces and Amanullah's hopes rose high only later to be dashed to the ground. The arrival of the Hazaras cemented the Afghan tribes of Ghazni against Amanullah and Amanullah's star now definitely commenced to decline.

An old enmity exists between the Hazaras and the Afghans of the Ghazni district. As soon as the Hazara contingent had arrived, those Khans who were antagonistic to Amanullah, such as Akhundzada Sarboland, the Mullah of Khado Khel; Aminullah Khan and Abdul Hakim Khan Taraks mounted their horses and taking leaflets given to them by Muhammad Karim, the pro-Bacha Saqao Hakim in Ghazni, toured amongst the Andar, Tarak and Suleman Khel tribesmen and energetically disseminated propaganda and enlarged on the theme that were Amanullah, in truth not a

Kafir he would not have called in the Hazaras, their traditional enemies, whose presence meant only one thing and that being the crushing of the Afghans by non-Afghan tribes. The propaganda had immediate effect. Where previously only twenty per cent. of the tribesmen had been hostile to Amanullah now there was a solid block against him. The tribes were definitely antagonistic and they girded up their loins to fight.

After an interval of three days, Amanullah gave the order to attack Ghazni. The Hazaras were kept in camp for its protection. An assault from all sides was made on the city and Ghazni was soon surrounded. Bacha Saqao's troops and Sipah Salar Purdil Khan were inside the walls. Artillery fire was directed on Amanullah's force from the upper citadel. Attacks were being made on Amanullh's forces by Ghilzais, Daftanis and Tajiks from the environs of Ghazni, the chief points being in the vicinity of the village of Khwaja Ahmed, Khwaja Hakim, Killa Nau and the gardens of Bahlul Sahib. Rain added to the discomforts of the day. At first Amanullah gained ground and driving out the enemy from the villages mentioned above occupied the positions and put them into a state of defence. For two nights Amanullah's forces held the ground they had won. Ghund Mishar Muhammad Zafar Khan proposed that the gates of Ghazni should be destroyed by burning them but they were too strongly defended . During all this time the flanks of Amanullah's force was harrassed by Ghilzai attacks launched from the directions of Shabanch. Forts occupied as strong points on this flank had been left without an adequate supply of rations and ammunition, through the negligence of Muhammad Yakub Khan, and eventually, these were surrounded and suffered heavy losses. The survivors succeeded in escaping by night and joined the rest of the force. The advance of Amanullah achieved practically nothing.

The Ghilzai leaders fighting against Amanullah were :—

Karim Khan, Sherani Manzai Suleman Khel;
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Marjan Khel;
Mullah Haider and Ahmed Shah, sons of Baz;
Abdullah Khan, Ibrahimzai Andar;
The Mullah of Khado Khel, and
Aminullah and Abdul Hakim, Taraks.

The Tajik leaders were :—

Haji Muhammad Akbar,
Syed Amir,
Muhammad Ishaq Khan, and
Muhammad Azam,

who were residents of the town of Ghazni and the Tajik villages of Bahlul and Rauza.

Amanullah now held a council of war. An excellent plan was evolved namely the occupation of the hillock, Tarak Hazrat, which is near the city and which commands the upper citadel and from where fire could be directed with great advantage. It was decided to employ about 2,000 men to carry the position. The troops consisted of 2 Kandaks under Muhammad Zafar Khan; one Herati Kandak and artillery under Toti Shah Khan; a contingent from Farah under Abdur Rauf Khan; the "bairaqs" of Mirza Muhammad Ayub, Kakar and Sadu Khan and 200 Shahjoi Wazirs.

Cold meat and bread was issued to this force and at twelve midnight it moved out of camp. By dawn they had captured the hillock and 4 guns, 50 sepoys, a few tents, a few horses and 24 boxes of ammunition fell into their hands. Artillery fire was brought to bear from this position against the upper citadel and the town. The Miri gate was opened. People in Ghazni, who were from the neighbourhood, fled. The citizens of Ghazni, with Qurans on their heads, were shouting for mercy. Bacha Saqao's men were busy writing out certificates of submission to Amanullah. But fate now took a hand in the game.

Just below the hillock, Tarak Hazrat, lies the village of Bahlul Sahib. The Wazirs evacuated the hillock and started to loot the village. Others followed the example of the Wazirs and Tarak Hazrat was left without any men. Seizing the opportunity, the inhabitants of Rauzah, about 1,000 strong, climbed the hillock and captured Amanullah's guns and immediately commenced a bombardment of those who were busy looting. The tables were turned and in disorder and leaving many dead in Bahlul Sahib the troops returned to camp quarrelling and blaming each other for the debacle.

From Wardak sources it was now learnt that about 3,000 Saqavis were moving on Ghazni *via* Khawat and that the Wardaks now asked for help to oppose this force and to prevent it reaching its destination. In response to this call for assistance 300 infantry 100 cavalry and 1 gun were sent under a Kandak Mishar from Herat. The Wardaks were proving very valuable and had stoutly denied the road to Ghazni to the forces of Bacha Saqao.

The Hazara leaders now requested that they should be allowed to attack Tarak Hazrat. This was granted and 4,000 Hazaras made ready to capture this strategical point.

They marched out at night and arrived near the hillock at eight in the morning. In the meantime Tarak Hazrat had been considerably strengthened. The fight was severe. It lasted from 9 A.M. to 4 P.M., but the Hazaras failed to take the position. Their losses amounted to approximately 300 killed and wounded. About 20 of their leaders being amongst those killed. Realizing that the Hazaras were unable to take the position, Amanullah, who had been observing the struggle through field glasses, personally wrote an order calling them off.

The Wardak lashkar had arrived during the day bringing with them some prisoners. They reported that they had routed Bacha Saqao's lashkar which had been marching towards Ghazni *via* Shiniz and Sheshqao and that the enemy had taken refugé in the forts in the neighbourhood. Amongst the prisoners taken by them was an Englishman. Adib Effendi was instructed to interrogate this person and to find out who he was. The man did not know any language except Russian and Afghani. He explained, in Russian, that he was a Pole from Warsaw; that four years previously he had gone to Herat where he had been put under arrest as a political suspect, that later he was sent to Kabul where he had established his innocence and had been released; that since then he had been in Afghanistan and that he had learnt Afghani at the residence of Malik Karim Khan of Sheran; that he had recently gone to Kabul at the suggestion of Karim Khan and had accompanied Bacha Saqao's forces merely to get to Ghazni in order to return to Karim Khan. It appeared evident, however, that the man was really a Russian sent with Bacha Saqao's men to assist them to fight on scientific principles. Amanullah gave orders that the affair was to be kept secret. Then Amanullah ordered the man to be brought before him. The man was produced handcuffed in front of His Majesty who having assembled all the troops addressed them as follows:—

"You will all have realized by now that this fratricidal bloodshed and chaos in Afghanistan is due solely to the intrigues of the British. Even the guns which are firing from Ghazni were given to the rebels by the British and I have observed through my glasses that the artillerymen are British. This man here is a Britisher. He was with Bacha Saqao's lashkar and was captured by the Wardaks. Know, therefore, that our fight is not with Bacha Saqao but with the British who are harrassing us". All those present were greatly excited. Amanullah then handed over the prisoner to the troops who led him away and stoned him to death.

Two unfortunate occurrences then took place. Bacha Saqao's aeroplanes flew over the camp and dropped bombs inflicting heavy casualties amongst men and animals. Saiyid Ashraf, the leading Bairaqdar was killed by a shell.

To add to these calamities the treasury was found to contain no silver only British notes. The Hazaras refused to accept notes. Twenty days hire of transport was in arrears and the owners demanded payment in cash threatening that they would otherwise remove their animals. The supply of ammunition, too, was nearly exhausted. Between 40-50 Kandahari and Herati soldier had deserted and in consequence the morale of the army was low. Amanullah, too, had become apprehensive and nervous. He sought out his two advisers, Muhammad Yakub and Hassan Jan, and held secret conferences with them. Their advice to him was to retire methodically from Ghazni and to abandon Afghanistan. They backed up the advice by stating that the whole Afghan nation was obviously against him. They pointed to the nightly desertion of Kandaharis and Heratis and argued that "As Your Majesty's ten years labours have not been appreciated by these ignorant fools you should quit Afghanistan and even if Your Majesty were to become King of what use would be, seeing that the conditions in Afghanistan have become chaotic and its wealth has been dissipated". Amanullah listened to these two men and considered the advice tendered to be sound. He then assembled the Kandahari Khans, the "Bairaqdars" and Abdul Ahad and explained the reasons for his contemplated retirement. The Kandaharis whose morale was now very low consented to a man. Abdul Ahad disagreed and pointed out that the Wardaks had captured large quantities of ammunition from Bacha Saqao's lashkar. He offered to defray the cost of the force whilst in Wardak territory and suggested that Ghazni should be disregarded and that an advance should be made on Kabul through Wardak country. Abdul Ahad, however, was the only man who did not favour a retirement and his plan was not agreed to.

Having arrived at a decision to retire, His Majesty issued the following order to the troops :—

"The road from Kandahar has been blocked. As it is essential to reopen the road the troops will march to Mukur. Punishment will then be meted out to the Andars and the advance will again be continued to Ghazni".

The troops believed the reasons given for the necessity to return to Mukur and the sycophants and courtiers were only too pleased to return to safety. At 10 P.M. the return march was commenced. Nani was reached at sunrise. No halt was made at Nani and Mashaki was reached in the evening. By 10 A.M. the Andars had realized the position and they attacked the column on the march. About 15-20 Kandaharis were killed. The ammunition reserve was raided on several occasions. Despite the long march the troops spent the night in Mashaki under arms as the enemy were all round the camp. The force started from Mashaki at 9 A.M. The flank and rear were attacked till eventually, the army arrived in Qarabagh. A halt for two days was made in the fort belonging to Sher Khan, Kharot. The Kandahari Khans and most of the men held the opinion that an immediate return to Kandahar should be made through the Hazarajat *via* the Tamaki, Sherberlah, Jaghuri and Uruzgan districts. But Amanullah who had made up his mind to escape into India *via* Mohmand Robat did not approve of the above route and insisted on retiring along the main road. After leaving Sher Khan's fort the force made a double march to Obeh. Throughout the march fighting was continuous. No supplies were available in Obeh. Mukur was reached the next day. No untoward incident marked the march to Mukur.

Ghulam Jilani with students trained in Turkey, had arrived in Mukur two days before Amanullah's arrival. Ghulam Jilani comforted Amanullah with information that Ghulam Nabi was advancing on Kabul *via* Mazar-i-Sharif and that great preparations were being made in Herat by Shuja-ud-Daulah and by Muhammad Anwar in Farah and by the War Minister in Kandahar. Nadir Khan was also said to be working on Amanullah's behalf. Somewhat reassured Amanullah consented to remain in Mukur. Ghulam

Jilani was placed in command of the troops relieving Abdul Ahad and the Wazir-i-Darbar. Excellent arrangements were made by Ghulam Jilani despite the fact that Muhammad Yakub attempted to undermine his authority by underhand propaganda.

Desertions now were of common occurrence. Aeroplanes from Kabul dropped pamphlets addressed to the Hotaks and Tokhis intimating that Amanullah had suffered serious reverses with the result that the Mukurites became hostile and commenced to cut the telephone wires and carried away transport animals. The position became untenable and Amanullah retired to Kalat-i-Ghilzai. Azizullah, Babbai, who was Hakim in Kalat, passed word to his own people, the Ghilzais not to provide any supplies. Five days were passed under great difficulties.

News was received whilst in Kalat that Abdur Rahim had captured Herat and had defeated Muhammad Ghaus and that Shuja-ud-Daulah had fled. Meanwhile Bacha Saqao's forces had reached Sar-i-Asp, only one march form Kalat-i-Ghilzai. The attitude of the Kandaharis, too, had changed towards Amanullah and His Majesty hurriedly conferred with his personal entourage. He informed the troops that he was returning to Kandahar and that he would send Wali Ali Ahmed Jan to command them. He himself would supervise and ensure adequate supplies reaching them from Kandahar. Ghulam Jilani, he said, was being sent to the Eastern Province. The troops did not agree to this and an uproar ensued.

Realizing that the situation was critical Amanullah entered his car and drove out of the Kalat gardens followed by his personal staff also in cars. Bacha Saqao's forces had by this time entered the environs of Kalat. The Kandaharis packed up and abandoned their positions and Kalat fell into the hands of Bacha Saqao without opposition.

Amanullah on arrival at Mohmand Robat, cut the telephone to Kalat, halted until it was dark, arranged with the Home Minister in Kandahar by telephone for the evacuation of his family and departed for Chaman.

NOTE ON ISHAQ DOLI BY THE O. C. HAZARA PIONEERS.

Ishaq Doli.—First cousin of No. 78 Naik Kurban, the Hazara Pioneers. Tribe: Jagheri. Son of Khuda Nazar. Village: Daud Sang-i-Masha, Ghazni.

By profession a brigand, His cousin says that he goes sick unless he shoots up at least five Sunnis a day. Exercises his profession in the Ghazni and Mukur districts.

Possesses five British Government rifles of present pattern taken by him from Sunni Afghan owners.

Took a Jagheri "lashkar" to aid Amanullah. Made a Colonel by the latter in April 1929 at Mukur. Was present at the fighting in the Wardak country and afterwards at Ghazni and Mukur. After Amanullah's flight to India Ishaq returned to Ghazni and took part in further fighting. In October 1929 was in Malistan where he robbed a caravan.

Ishaq has come twice to Baluchistan to visit his cousin Qurban. In 1925 he stayed in Jacob's Lines, Quetta, in the Regimental Guest House. Was invited to range practice by the Adjutant Captain Stephenson. Was given ammunition for snapshooting at 300 and 500 yards. Made a highest possible score at both ranges. In 1927 visited No. 3 Company at Tang Haiderzai where it was employed on road construction. Went shooting with Lieut. Turner. A useful shot.

The fire of his rifle is described as the equivalent of Lewis Gun fire.

On the last occasion that he was in Quetta he had with him three British Government rifles. These did not bear any regimental name or number.

GIPD—742(C) F&PD—22-3-30—45

PRESIDENT'S
SECRETARIAT

LIBRARY